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The International Law 
Commission’s First Draft 
Convention on Crimes Against 
Humanity: Codification, 
Progressive Development, or 
Both? 
Charles C. Jalloh1 
Abstract 
In 2017, the International Law Commission (“ILC”) which was 
established by the UN General Assembly in 1947 to assist States with 
the promotion of (1) the progressive development of international law 
and (2) its codification, adopted on first reading a draft convention on 
crimes against humanity which it transmitted to States for comments. 
The draft convention seeks to help fill the present gap in the law of 
international crimes since States criminalized genocide in 1948 and war 
crimes in 1949, but missed the opportunity to do so for crimes against 
humanity. This Article examines the first reading text, as submitted to 
States in August 2017, using the lens of the ILC’s two-pronged 
mandate. Part II explains how the ILC selects new topics and the 
reasons why it decided to study crimes against humanity with the view 
to proposing a convention. Part III discusses positive features of the 
draft crimes against humanity convention, highlighting key aspects of 
each of the draft articles. Part IV examines challenges posed by the 
ILC’s definition of the crime, immunities, amnesties, and the lack of a 
proposal on a treaty monitoring mechanism. The final part draws 
tentative conclusions. The author argues that, notwithstanding the 
formal distinction drawn by the ILC Statute between progressive 
development, on the one hand, and codification, on the other hand, the 
ILC’s approach to the crimes against humanity topic follows an 
established methodology of proposing draft treaties that are judged 
 
1. Professor of Law, Florida International University and Member, 
International Law Commission and Chair of the Drafting Committee, 70th 
session. This paper was initially prepared for a 70th anniversary 
symposium on “The Role and Contributions of the ILC to the 
Development of International Law: Codification, Progressive 
Development, or Both?” held at FIU College of Law in Miami on 26-27 
October 2018.  I thank Dean Michael Scharf for inviting me to present on 
the topic in the Case Western Law School symposium on “Atrocity 
Prevention: The Role of International Law and Justice” on 20 September 
2019, which nudged me to finalize this piece. Ashira Vantrees, Cecilia 
Ruiz Lujan, Jennifer Triana provided excellent research assistance. 
Opinions and errors are mine alone. Email: jallohc@gmail.com.  
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likely to be effective and broadly acceptable to States rather than 
focusing on which provisions reflect codification and which constitute 
progressive development of the law. It is submitted that, if the General 
Assembly takes forward the ILC’s draft text to conclude a new crimes 
against humanity treaty after the second reading, this will make a 
significant contribution to the development of modern international 
criminal law.  
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The International Law Commission (“ILC” or  
“the Commission”) was established as a subsidiary body of the United 
Nations General Assembly in November 1947 to assist States with the 
promotion of the progressive development of international law and its 
codification.2 This mandate is not only the statutory foundation on 
which the work of the ILC rests, but it is also at the heart of the 
discussions involving the ILC’s past contributions, its present projects, 
and if the statute remains unamended, its future potential.  
 
2. G.A. Res. 174 (II), art. 1, Statute of the International Law Commission 
(Nov. 21, 1947).  
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In the seven decades since it was established, the Commission has 
been widely praised, by States3 and academics4 alike, for its various 
contributions to the development of the field of international law. The 
Commission’s inputs include areas as diverse as the law of treaties,5 the 
 
3. Miguel de Serpa Soares, Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and 
United Nations Legal Counsel, Commemoration of the 70th Anniversary 
of the International Law Commission—1st Meeting (May 21, 2018), 
http://webtv.un.org/search/commemoration-of-the-70th-anniversary-of-
the-international-law-commission/5787804822001#t=22m35s 
[https://perma.cc/5J5Q-XNQM]; See also, e.g., Amadou Jaiteh, First 
Secretary of the Permanent Mission of the Gambia to the United Nations, 
Statement on Behalf of the African Group Before the Sixth Committee, 
73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of its Seventieth Session, at 
2 (Oct. 22, 2018), 
http://statements.unmeetings.org/media2/20304330/gambia-african-
group-82-.pdf [https://perma.cc/XX2U-8496]; H.E. Sheila Carey, 
Permanent Representative of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas to the 
United Nations, Statement on Behalf of the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM), 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 
Report of the International Law Commission of the Work of its Seventieth 
Session, at 2 (Oct. 22, 2018), 
http://statements.unmeetings.org/media2/20304299/bahamas-caricom-
82-.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AH9-PK3S]; Xu Hong, Statement of the 
Representative of China and Director-General of the Department of 
Treaty and Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 73rd Session 
of the United Nations General Assembly, Report of the International Law 
Commission of the Work of its Seventieth Session, at 2 (Oct. 22, 2018), 
http://statements.unmeetings.org/media2/20304363/china-82-cluster-
i.pdf [https://perma.cc/K726-2DEL]; Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, 
Statement of the Chair of the International Law Commission, 73rd Session 
of the United Nations General Assembly, Report of the International Law 
Commission of the Work of its Seventieth Session, at 1 (Oct. 22, 2018), 
https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/en/ga/sixth/73rd-
session/statements/ [https://perma.cc/N754-S8MS]. 
4. JEFFREY S. MORTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS (U. of S. C. Press, 2000); SIR IAN SINCLAIR, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION (Grotius Publications Ltd, 1987). 
5. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of the First Part of Its 
Seventeenth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/181, at 156–59 (1965), 
https://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/documentation/english/reports/a
_cn4_181.pdf&lang=EF [https://perma.cc/465U-GUUK]; Int’l Law 
Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/191, at 173–77 (1966), 
https://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/documentation/english/reports/a
_cn4_191.pdf&lang=EFSRC [https://perma.cc/MJ4J-XYQ8].  
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law of diplomatic and consular relations,6 the law of the sea,7 
international environmental law,8 and of course, the law of State 
responsibility.9 Much, if not all, of the Commission’s work in those areas 
reflects the aspects of its mandate to assist States with both the 
codification and the progressive development of international law. But, 
arguably none of these areas, although foundational to the post World 
War II international legal order, have permeated the work of the 
Commission throughout the last seven decades as much as the field of 
international criminal law. Only two exceptions come to mind. 
First is the Law of Treaties. The Law of Treaties, which might be 
the Commission’s most important contribution to date, formed the 
basis for what eventually became the 1969 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (“VCLT”).10 Its significance is further exemplified by 
the many subsequent “spin-off” projects it has generated for the 
Commission since its entry into force.11 Those studies, largely aimed at 
accounting for lessons learned following decades of application of the 
VCLT to concrete situations as well as new developments, continue to 
dominate the Commission’s program of work.12 Indeed, entire studies 
have been conducted based on provisions, and in some cases, sections 
 
6. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session 1966, 
supra note 5, at 177; See also G.A. Res. 3233 (XXIX) (Nov. 12, 1974). 
7. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session 1966, 
supra note 5, at 192. 
8. See Luis Barrionuevo Arevalo, The Work of the International Law 
Commission in the Field of International Environmental Law, 32 B.C. 
ENV’T AFF. L. REV. 493, 493 (2005).  
9. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session 1966, 
supra note 5, at 177; JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 1 (James Crawford 
ed., Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
10. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331. 
11. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Seventh Session, 
U.N. Doc. A/70/10, at 138 (2015) [hereinafter Rep. in Sixty-Seventh 
Session]. 
12. Id. (including the topic Jus cogens—a study of VCLT art. 53—in the 
Commission program of work) [hereinafter Rep. on Sixty-Seventh 
Session]; Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Fourth 
Session, U.N. Doc. A/67/10, at 105 (2011) (including the topic Provisional 
application of treaties—a study of VCLT art. 25—to the Commissions 
program of work); see also Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its 
Seventieth Session, U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at 12 (2018) (completing the 
second reading of Draft Conclusions on subsequent agreements and 
subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties—a study 
of VCLT art. 31(2)(a)—submitted to the General Assembly in 2018) 
[hereinafter Rep. on Seventieth Session].  
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or paragraphs of articles from the VCLT. For instance, the Commission 
has completed additional work on reservations to treaties13 (section 2 
of the VCLT, comprised of Articles 19 to 24) and subsequent 
agreements and subsequent practice (Article 31(3)).14 The Commission 
has ongoing work on provisional application of treaties (Article 25) and 
peremptory norms of general international law—jus cogens (Articles 
53/64).15 Not to mention, at the request of the General Assembly, the 
application of the VCLT to unresolved questions concerning treaties 
concluded between States and international organizations or between 
international organizations.16  
The second exception of an area that continues to influence the 
work of the Commission are the Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts.17 The State responsibility articles have 
not (yet) been transformed into a multilateral convention, like the 
VCLT. The study on State responsibility coincided with the bulk of the 
Commission’s existence. An outcome of about 40 years of work over a 
seventy-year period.18 In fact, from the commencement of the study in 
1956 and its completion upon second reading and eventual submission 
with a final recommendation to the General Assembly in 2001, the topic 
was guided by no less than five ILC Special Rapporteurs.19 Questions 
of responsibility have also continued to generate further work for the 
 
13. See Rep. on Seventieth Session, supra note 12, at 12 (draft conclusions on 
subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the 
interpretation of treaties submitted to the General Assembly in 2018). 
14. Id. at 14; See also G.A. Res. 73/202, at 1–2 (Dec. 20, 2018). 
15. See Int’l L. Comm’n, Summaries of the Work of the International Law 
Commission, https://legal.un.org/ilc/summaries/1_12.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/9BZP-6Q7C] (last visited Feb. 17, 2020); Rep. 
Seventieth Session, supra note 12, at 227. 
16. See U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organizations or between International Organizations, 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and 
International Organizations or Between International Organizations, U.N. 
Doc. A/Conf.129/15, U.N. Sales No. E.94. V.5 at 95 (Mar. 21, 1986) (not 
yet in force: 39 Signatories, 44 Parties). 
17. See James Crawford, Jacqueline Peel & Simon Olleson, The ILC’s Articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: Completion 




19. See id. 
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ILC, in relation to, for example, the responsibility of international 
organizations20 and issues of State succession.21 
This article examines the role and contributions of the ILC in the 
promotion of the progressive development of international law and its 
codification from the perspective of the nascent field of International 
Criminal Law (“ICL”). Though not unique, if we account for the law 
of treaties—which, like a ghost, continues to hang around the corridors 
of the Commission—and the sheer scope and depth of State 
responsibility, the ICL field appears to have occupied a special place in 
the life of the ILC. This is because the Commission’s first project, 
mandated to it by the General Assembly on November 27, 1947, was 
in fact the formulation of the principles of international law recognized 
in the Charter and in the Judgment of the Nürnberg International 
Military Tribunal (“IMT”).22 Recognizing the importance of this 
maiden ICL topic for the Commission appears important for both 
symbolic and substantive reasons.  
Symbolically, the IMT was the first successful attempt to establish 
an ad hoc “international” penal tribunal to prosecute persons 
responsible for crimes under international law: namely, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and crimes against peace.23 Thus, although 
the idea had been first planted just after World War I, it was World 
War II and the establishment of the IMT sitting at Nürnberg that 
cracked the door open  to the hitherto unknown possibility of an 
international criminal tribunal that would address responsibility to 
individuals as part of the enforcement of certain fundamental values of 
the international community, Nürnberg became the “Grotian”24 
 
20. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Third Session, U.N. 
Doc. A/66/10, at 54–68 (2011). 
21. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Nov. 
6, 1996, 1946 U.N.T.S. 3; U.N. Conference of Succession of States in 
respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, Vienna Convention on 
Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, 
U.N. Sale No. E.94.V.6 (Apr. 8, 1983) (not yet in force); See also Pavel 
Šturma (Special Rapporteur on Succession of States in Respect of State 
Responsibility), Second Rep. on Succession of States in Respect of State 
Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/719 (Apr. 6, 2018). 
22. Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg 
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n 13, U.N. Doc. A/CN/SER.A/1950/Add. I. 
23. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War 
Criminals of the European Axis, Annex, Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 280.  
24. MICHAEL P. SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIMES OF 
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE: RECOGNIZING GROTIAN MOMENTS (Cambridge 
University Press, 2013).  
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moment for ICL. The new Commission was thereafter tasked with 
reflecting upon the implications of that watershed for States and the 
international community.25 This included the possibility of developing 
an international criminal code26 and a corresponding international 
enforcement mechanism to give effect to its prohibitions.27  
Substantively, the principles formulated by the Commission for the 
General Assembly now form part of the starting point and thus the 
bedrock of modern ICL. This is largely due to the foundational nature 
and broad acceptance28 of the Nürnberg Principles, which in seven 
broad strokes helped to cement a new global norm—that is, the notion 
that any person who commits an act constituting a crime under 
international law, such as crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity, is responsible therefor and liable to punishment.29 
The Nürnberg Principles, by taking up key issues that continue to be 
the basis of international criminal prosecutions, have directly and 
indirectly played a role in influencing international law’s attitude 
towards the rights and duties of individuals as well as the obligations 
of States under international criminal law.  
 
25. See G.A. Res. 177 (II) (Nov. 21, 1947). 
26. G.A. Res. 36/106, ¶¶ 1–2 (Dec. 10, 1981). 
27. G.A. Res. 260 (III) B, ¶¶ 1–3 (Dec. 9, 1948).  
28. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision 
Pursuant to Art. 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Refusal of the Republic 
of Chad to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court 
with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al 
Bashir, ¶ 13 (Dec. 13, 2011), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_04203.PDF [https://perma.cc/8RJT-
LNKE]; Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, 
Corrigendum to the Decision Pursuant to Art. 87(7) of the Rome Statute 
on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation 
Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender 
of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶ 43 (Dec. 13, 2011), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2011_21750.PDF [https://perma.cc/MR5G-
6JEA]; Prosecutor v Tadić , Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 94 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) [https://perma.cc/3TUL-
TGUW]; Nahimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment, ¶ 
485 (Nov. 28, 2007), https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-
documents/ictr-99-52/appeals-chamber-judgements/en/071128.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3A4P-RLMK]; Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-
03-1-T, Judgement Summary, ¶ 2 (Apr. 26, 2012), 
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/1283/Charles%20Ta
ylor%20Summary%20Judgement.pdf [https://perma.cc/85EH-3R28]. 
29. See, e.g., Principles of International Law, supra note 22 (explaining 
Principle III to mean that the official capacity of the criminal is irrelevant 
and Principle IV to mean that nations have a general obligation to 
prevent and punish crimes against humanity). 
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Nonetheless, the Commission’s contribution to ICL did not end 
with the Nürnberg Principles. In fact, it proved to be just the beginning. 
It has since covered a diverse set of ICL issues; most prominently, the 
question of international criminal jurisdiction, a draft code of crimes 
against the peace and security of humankind, and ultimately, work on 
a draft statute for a permanent international criminal court.30 Since its 
early forays in the subject area, often at the request of the General 
Assembly, the Commission has also, through its own initiative, taken 
up several topics aimed at advancing the largely twentieth century 
notion of individual criminal responsibility for international crimes, 
alongside mechanisms for the enforcement of such prohibitions—
whether at the national or international levels.  
The ILC’s work in this area, some of which is ongoing as of this 
writing, has touched on central and inter-related topics for this sub-
field. These include the question concerning the definition of aggression, 
which for reasons largely relating to the Cold War bounced back and 
forth for several years between the Commission and the Sixth 
Committee like ping-pong until the General Assembly itself completed 
the task with the adoption of a resolution on the topic by consensus in 
1974;31 the obligation to prosecute or extradite (aut dedere aut 
judicare);32 immunity of State officials from foreign criminal 
jurisdiction; and most recently, crimes against humanity. The 
Commission appears open to the prospect of continuing to work in the 
area of criminal law with the addition to its long-term program of work 
in 2006 of the topic extraterritorial jurisdiction.33 Even more recently - 
based on a proposal of this writer, approved in 2018 - and included in 
its report to the General Assembly on the work of its seventieth session,  
the ILC placed the topic universal criminal jurisdiction in its long-term 
program of work.34  
This article will not examine all the ILC’s rich contributions to the 
development of the ICL field. Rather, its aim is to examine a specific 
 
30. G.A. Res. 489 (V) (Dec. 12, 1950); Draft Code of Crimes Against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind, A/CN.4/L.532 (1996), reprinted in [1996] 
2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1 (Part 2) 
[hereinafter Peace and Security]; Draft Statute for an International 
Criminal Court with Commentaries, [1996] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 20, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1 (Part 2). 
31. See THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 124–25 (United 
Nations Publ’n, 9th ed. 2017) (summarizing the completion of the topic 
of aggression in 2010).   
32. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Sixth Session, U.N. 
Doc. A/69/10, at 139-40 (2014); G.A. Res. 69/118, ¶ 3 (Dec. 10, 2014).  
33. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Eighth Session, U.N. 
Doc. A/61/10, at 526 (2006).   
34. Rep. on Seventieth Session, supra note 12, at 316. 
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and contemporary ICL topic which some might consider the 
Commission’s current flagship project because it is the only explicitly 
declared convention project: the Commission’s first Draft Convention 
on Crimes Against Humanity,35 which draft was completed during the 
sixty-ninth session in August 2017 and submitted to States for 
comments via the General Assembly in September 2017. As usual, the 
Commission has invited State comments on the first reading text.36 All 
States’ comments are due at the beginning of December 2018.37  
The primary goal of the article, which focuses on the text as 
adopted on first reading, is to examine the positive, and less positive, 
aspects of the ILC’s draft convention from the lens of codification and 
progressive development. The paper, in seeking to highlight key aspects 
of what will hopefully eventually form part of the ILC’s latest 
codification contribution to the development of ICL, will suggest that 
even in highly technical areas, the theme of progressive development 
and codification, which is so central to the work and identity of the 
Commission, continues to remain important. The underlying feature of 
progressive development and codification, though it did not per se drive 
the debate on this topic as it has on other current topics such as 
immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, seemed to 
lurk in the background. The background hum of the Commission’s 
mandate may be among the best explanations for the more contentious 
parts of the crimes against humanity project, which generally aims to 
provide substantive clarity on the vital aspects of probably the most 
important of the four core international crimes: crimes against 
humanity.  
Structurally, this article will proceed as follows. Part II seeks to 
provide some of the background context for the study. It explains the 
internal ILC process for the selection of new topics and considers why 
the crimes against humanity project seems important for both the ILC 
and the international community. Part III, which is the heart of the 
article, will examine each of the proposed articles and highlight some 
of the most prominent features of the draft convention as proposed by 
the Commission in its 2017 first reading text. Part IV then turns to the 
aspects of the text adopted by the ILC in relation to which I had some 
doubts. With respect to each of these parts, I will attempt to explain 
how the mandate of progressive development and codification could be 
relevant in appreciating the debate within the Commission and the 
 
35. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, U.N. 
Doc. A/72/10, at 10–20 (2017). 
36. Id. at 10. 
37. Int’l Law Comm’n, Analytical Guide to the Work of the International Law 
Commission, https://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/7_7.shtml (last updated Feb. 
19, 2020) [https://perma.cc/FJ9J-5G74]. 
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compromise text that was adopted and submitted to States for their 
consideration. The final part draws tentative conclusions.  
Readers must bear in mind that there remains a final second 
reading step for the crimes against humanity project, which is expected 
to be completed during the 71st session of the Commission in 2019.38 It 
is normal that, based on the comments of States and observers, some 
of the text adopted on first reading will change. A formal 
recommendation will thereafter be formulated by the Commission to 
accompany its final text to the General Assembly. At that stage, it will 
be up to the States to decide whether to take forward the item by 
convening a diplomatic conference or through direct negotiation of the 
treaty text by the General Assembly.39 It is hoped that, after many 
years of placing on the shelf the more recent outcomes of the 
Commission’s outputs, the General Assembly and States will see it fit 
to take forward the draft convention proposed by the ILC. In this way, 
they will not only better mind the present big gap in the prohibition of 
atrocity crimes, but also re-establish the relevance of the Commission’s 
current work and its central role as the only general UN created body 
engaged in assisting them with the tasks of codification and progressive 
development of general international law.   
II. Background: The ILC’s Process and the Decision 
to Study Crimes against Humanity  
A. The General Assembly and Proprio Motu Action as Two Potential 
Sources of New ILC Topics  
By way of background, there are two principal methods by which 
the ILC can carry out its statutory responsibilities to study 
international law questions for States and the international community. 
First, under the Statute, adopted by States in 1947, the General 
Assembly, other principal UN organs or specialized agencies may refer 
topics to the ILC for study in accordance with the provisions of the 
Statute of the Commission.40 While this occurred relatively frequently 
in the past in relation to the General Assembly, including in respect of 
several ICL topics including the draft statute for a permanent 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) which was requested in 1994, 
 
38. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra 
note 35, at 9-10. 
39. See id. at 5. 
40. G.A. Res. 174 (II), arts. 16-17, Statute of the International Law 
Commission (Nov. 21, 1947). 
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such referrals have been infrequent more recently.41 The latter was 
noticed, so much so that in 1996, the ILC review of its working 
procedures at the request of the General Assembly itself emphasized to 
the parent body that States and other relevant UN organs be 
encouraged to submit proposals for new topics involving codification 
and progressive development of international law.42  
Second, the ILC is statutorily entrusted with surveying the whole 
field of international law with the goal of  selecting topics for 
codification and recommending them to the General Assembly.43 Much 
of the Commission’s work carried out in the past several decades was 
based on the first such survey of possible codification projects in a 
memorandum of the Secretariat in 1949. In its practice, dating back to 
1949, the Commission concluded that it possessed the competence to 
work on proposed studies notified to States through the General 
Assembly for their feedback without necessarily first securing formal 
action before it proceeds.44 This aspect apparently recognizes the 
independent role of the ILC as an expert body.  
In reality, however, topics usually receive feedback from States 
after their addition to the long-term program of work before substantive 
work begins. This preserves the central role of States in the process and 
underscores the role of the technical experts is merely to assist the 
General Assembly in its primary responsibility to promote international 
cooperation in the political field and the promotion of the progressive 
development of international law and its codification.45 This means that 
ILC proposed topics usually benefit from feedback and are formally 
endorsed or taken note of in a General Assembly resolution.46 It is only 
after such a step that, based on several additional considerations like 
the nature of the comments received, that the ILC will take a separate 
and subsequent decision on whether to study the proposed topic further 
 
41. See United Nations, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
https://legal.un.org/icc/general/overview.htm [https://perma.cc/9FDK-
CPMH]. 
42. Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of Its 
Forty-Eighth Session, 51 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 
(1996), 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, Sales No. E.97.I.1. 
43. G.A. Res. 174 (II), supra note 40, art. 18. 
44. Int’l L. Comm’n, About the Commission: Organization, Programme and 
Methods of Work, https://legal.un.org/ilc/programme.shtml (last 
updated Sept. 16, 2019) [https://perma.cc/W6AK-33V2] [hereinafter 
Programme and Methods]. 
45. See United Nations, Codification and Progressive Development of 
International Law, https://legal.un.org/cod/ [https://perma.cc/YA5W-
AXRL]. 
46. See Programme and Methods, supra note 44. 
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by moving it into its active program of work.47 A topic that does not 
generate any interest amongst States is unlikely to make it into the 
current program of work.48 Topics that only generate lukewarm interest 
or that are perceived as mostly political or policy oriented may also 
meet the same fate.49 That said, while there is a rigorous process for 
inclusion of topics into the long-term program of work, the assessment 
of the potential suitability of topics for the active work program turns 
on various other considerations and becomes a matter of collective 
judgment.50 The latter process, being sometimes dependent on whether 
a handful of oppositional members are willing to concede or block the 
(overwhelming) majority view, could no doubt be improved.  
B. The Addition of Crimes against Humanity to the Long-Term 
Program of Work 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, and due also to the increased development 
of other fora and sites of law making for States, the second path 
discussed above wherein topics are mostly internally generated has 
formed the basis for most of the ILC’s work and outputs in the past 
seventy years.51 Of late, for various complex reasons, it has been the 
only path. This means that, like all the Commission’s current projects, 
the topic crimes against humanity, which is the focus here, began with 
a proposal initiated by a member.52 The proposal in this case was 
presented by Sean Murphy (USA). All member proposals are considered 
by the Working Group on the Long-Term Program of Work, which is 
a subsidiary body of the Planning Group.53 The latter is established by 
the Commission to which it reports and retains the same membership 
 
47. Programme and Methods, supra note 44. 
48. See Yota Negishi, The International Law Commission Celebrating Its 70th 
Anniversary, ESIL: Reflections (Nov. 12, 2018), https://esil-sedi.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/11/ESIL-Reflection-Negishi-3.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/94RA-VV4G]. 
49. See id. 
50. See, e.g., Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, 
supra note 35, at 126 (noting with appreciation the decision of the 
Commission to add the topic of provisional application of treaties to the 
Commissions programme of work, thus showing the need for General 
Assembly support). 
51. See Programme and Methods, supra note 44. 
52. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Topical Summary of the Discussion Held in the 
Sixth Committee of the General Assembly During Its Sixty-Ninth Session, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/678, at 21-22 (2015). 
53. See Programme and Methods, supra note 44. 
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each year.54 A topic proposal must fulfill certain criteria agreed by the 
Commission in 1996 and reiterated in 1998 before it can secure 
approval.55  
As part of a multi-stage internal review process, in the more recent 
practice, the long-term program working group operating on the basis 
of consensus decides whether the formal topic selection criteria have 
been fulfilled. In this regard, it carefully assesses (1) whether a given 
proposal appears to meet the needs of States in respect of the 
progressive development and codification of international law; (2) if the 
topic is sufficiently advanced in stage in terms of State practice; and 
(3) if the topic is concrete and feasible, provided that (4) the 
Commission shall not restrict itself to traditional topics but could also 
reflect those newer and pressing concerns of the international 
community as a whole.56 In this case, in regards crimes against 
humanity, the working group concluded that all these criteria had been 
fulfilled.57  
The principal argument in favor of the crimes against humanity 
topic was that there exists, in the present international legal framework, 
a yawning gap in the field of ICL.58 In particular, as it relates to the 
law of “core international crimes,” that is, genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and although the last was not mentioned in the 
proposal, the crime of aggression.59 Whereas genocide and war crimes 
have been codified in standalone multilateral treaties requiring States 
to investigate and prosecute those who commit them within their 
national courts, there is no equivalent global convention concerning 
crimes against humanity.60 Considering that the latter crime is the 
 
54. Int’l Law Comm’n, About the Commission, 
https://legal.un.org/ilc/structure.shtml (last updated Jan. 11, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/BH33-ARQB]. 
55. Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of Its 
Forty-Eighth Session, supra note 42, at 87-88. 
56. Programme and Methods, supra note 44. 
57. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/68/10, at 144 (2013). 
58. Id. at 140-41. 
59. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
60. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide 
Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva I]; Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva 
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 
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broadest crime available, vis-à-vis the other core crimes, the need to 
codify it in its own separate instrument and thereby provide greater 
legal certainty in its use becomes very important.  
As a second main justification, there is at present no regime of 
inter-State cooperation providing for mutual legal assistance and 
extradition for crimes against humanity at the horizontal level.61 Yet, 
perhaps partly because of how suppression or transnational crimes 
conventions have evolved on a separate track vis-à-vis atrocity crimes, 
the international community has developed such cooperation regimes 
for numerous transnational crimes conventions such as corruption.62 
The latter may be considered less heinous crimes than crimes against 
humanity.63 By providing for a treaty that would address crimes against 
humanity specifically, it was felt that this could enhance the 
investigation and prosecution of crimes at the national level.64 
Empowering domestic courts to prosecute crimes against humanity is 
distinct from the jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals such as 
the ICC, which operates at the vertical/international level.65 Thus, 
especially given that the Rome Statute does not as such include an 
explicit duty for States to prosecute crimes against humanity but 
requires States to act as the first line of defense against impunity, a 
special convention on crimes against humanity was found as a potential 
useful complement of that system.66 This should  enhance the 
complementarity regime under the ICC system. In the end, based on 
the syllabus proposal, it was decided that it was about time that the 
ILC considered taking up this important topic with the view of 
potentially assisting States to codify this important international crime 
in a separate treaty aimed at both prevention and punishment of those 
who perpetrate it.67  
 
75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 
[hereinafter Geneva IV]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of 
international armed conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
61. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra 
note 35, at 110. 
62. Sean D. Murphy (Special Rapporteur on Crimes Against Humanity), First 
Rep. on Crimes Against Humanity, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/680, at 6 (Feb. 
17, 2015) [hereinafter Murphy, First Rep.] 
63. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra 
note 35, at 21. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 22. 
66. Id. 
67. Murphy, First Rep., supra note 62, at 7. 
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As usual with the Commission topic selection process, the decision 
of the working group on the work program is reported to the parent 
Planning Group chaired by the first vice chair of the Commission for 
that session.68 The Planning Group, in turn, reports to the plenary of 
the ILC as a whole.69 The Commission, after consideration of the report, 
endorsed the working group decision at the level of the plenary of the 
Commission which then subsequently decided to recommend the 
inclusion of the topic crimes against humanity to the Long-Term 
Program of Work during the Sixty-Fifth Session.70 The crimes against 
humanity topic, the syllabus for which was annexed to the 2013 report, 
was thereafter notified to the General Assembly with a request for 
feedback from States on the proposed topic.71 There, States proved to 
be generally favorable towards the topic, though there was some 
concern that whatever the Commission does in the topic, should 
complement rather than undermine the legal regime anchored by the 
ICC.72 The General Assembly took note of the topic in its resolution 
that year.73  
C. The Addition of Crimes against Humanity to the Current Program 
of Work 
Upon resumption of its work in the summer of 2014, the ILC 
analyzed the feedback of States on the crimes against humanity 
proposal in the General Assembly.74 Given the generally favorable State 
reactions towards the topic, and the availability of space on its program 
of work, the Commission decided to move crimes against humanity on 
to the Commission’s current program of work.75 Consistent with the 
ILC practice, Mr. Murphy, the proponent of the topic was appointed 
as Special Rapporteur.76 Special rapporteurs play an important role for 
the Commission in a volunteer capacity, helping to guide the 
formulation of a plan and leading the effort on the topic.77 The special 
 
68. About the Commission, supra note 54. 
69. Id. 
70. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Fifth Session, supra 
note 57, at 116. 
71. Id. at 140, 144. 
72. See id. at 142–43. 
73. G.A. Res 69/118, supra note 32, ¶ 7. 
74. See Int’l Law Comm’n, 66th Sess., 3227th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SR.3227 (July 18, 2014). 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. About the Commission, supra note 54. 
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rapporteurs typically prepare reports each year to further the work plan 
on the topic, explain the state of the law and make proposals for draft 
articles.   
Consistent with that role, in this topic as well, the Special 
Rapporteur prepared three reports for each of 2015, 2016 and 2017.78 
The reports would be circulated to the members just before arrival in 
the Swiss city of Geneva each summer, and following their introduction 
by the rapporteur, they would be debated by the members of the 
Commission in the plenary.79 After the debate closes, signified by the 
summing up by the special rapporteur, the proposed draft articles 
contained in each report would be transmitted to the Drafting 
Committee.80 In the drafting process, the members of the Commission 
that volunteered to serve on the drafting team for the topic would 
engage in a detailed and substantive process of review of every single 
paragraph, sentence, and comma.81 Issues of substance are also 
discussed, with the chair of the drafting committee and special 
rapporteur playing important roles, in plenty of informal discussions 
and negotiations to find a consensus.82 Once the articles are completed, 
they are reported back to the Plenary of the Commission, where they 
are adopted.83 The Commission would approve and subsequently 
include them in its annual report for onward transmission to the 
General Assembly where States get the opportunity to comment on 
 
78. Murphy, First Rep., supra note 62; Sean D. Murphy (Special Rapporteur 
on Crimes Against Humanity), Second Rep. on Crimes Against 
Humanity, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/690 (Jan. 21, 2016) [hereinafter Murphy, 
Second Rep.]; Sean D. Murphy (Special Rapporteur on Crimes Against 
Humanity), Third Rep. on Crimes Against Humanity, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/704 (Jan. 23, 2017) [hereinafter Murphy, Third Rep.]. 
79. Murphy, First Rep., supra note 62; Murphy, Second Rep., supra note 78; 
Murphy, Third Rep., supra note 78. 
80. About the Commission, supra note 54. 
81. See id. 
82. See id. 
83. See, e.g., Mathias Forteau, Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the 
International Law Commission, Statement on Crimes Against Humanity 
(June 5, 2015), 
https://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/documentation/english/statemen
ts/2015_dc_chairman_statement_crimes_against_humanity.pdf&lang
=EF [https://perma.cc/VHQ6-HYTS] (reporting on the first draft of the 
Convention on Crimes Against Humanity and requesting the plenary to 
adopt the draft). 
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them in the Sixth (Legal) Committee.84  The draft articles would 
typically be accompanied by commentaries explaining the text.  
At the Sixty-Ninth Session in 2017, that is, just four years after the 
project began, the Commission successfully adopted a complete set of 
draft articles on crimes against humanity.85 The first reading package 
contained a preamble, 15 draft articles, and a draft annex, all of which 
were accompanied by draft commentary.86 These were transmitted to 
States, through the Secretary-General, with a request inviting written 
comments from States by December 1, 2018.87 
 
III. Positive Aspects to the ILC’s First Draft 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Crimes Against Humanity  
A. An Opportunity to Prepare a Draft Convention for the General 
Assembly 
Before I highlight the substance of the draft articles, as adopted by 
the Commission upon first reading in August of 2017, it seems 
noteworthy that the crimes against humanity project is important both 
for the ILC and the international community. First, and though 
perhaps the least important reason is that for the ILC, which has in 
the past been criticized for its deliberative—or should I say too 
deliberative—pace of work, the completion of the first reading of the 
draft articles on crimes against humanity stands as a major 
accomplishment. All the more so given the relatively short period 
between the addition of the topic to its program of work in the summer 
of 2014, the appointment of a Special Rapporteur the same year, and 
the completion of the first reading with a full set of draft articles with 
commentary in the summer of 2017.88 The credit for this lightning 
speed, in ILC terms, must go to the Commission as a whole. But it 
would not have been possible without a dedicated Special Rapporteur, 
as well as an engaged and cooperative Drafting Committee and 
 
84. See Topical Summary of the Discussion Held in the Sixth Committee of 
the General Assembly During Its Seventieth Session, Prepared by the 
Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/689, at 8-10 (Jan. 28, 2016). 
85. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra 
note 35, at 10–21. 
86. Id. at 9–10. 
87. Id. at 10. 
88. Id. 
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Commission.89 The significance of this point should not be 
underestimated as it in some respects confirms – contrary to external 
criticisms of the Commission in the 1980s – that the ILC is capable of 
taking up a new topic and turning around a rigorous first draft 
instrument within a relatively short time frame.  Second, the crimes 
against humanity project can also be seen as important to the ILC; for 
it is, at present, the only topic whereby the Commission has explicitly 
declared, from day one in the Syllabus for the topic, that it will be 
working in the most traditional or classical part of its mandate,90 that 
being to prepare legal texts, for the General Assembly, which have the 
potential, or capacity, to become treaties.91 This too is important 
because many of the ILC’s more recent projects have softer forms such 
as draft conclusions and draft guidelines. The seeming shift towards the 
preparation of other types of instruments does not mean that the 
Commission will neglect its primary function to assist also with the 
codification of international law through the proposal of draft articles 
capable of creating binding legal obligations for States. In this regard, 
the Crimes against Humanity draft will soon join the 2016 draft articles 
on protection of persons in the event of disasters text which was the 
most recently adopted on second reading during the ILC’s sixth-eight 
session and recommended to the General Assembly for the elaboration 
as a convention.92   
B. The ILC’s “Composite” Approach to its Mandate and Application to 
Crimes against Humanity  
In accordance with Article 1 of its Statute, the Commission has as 
its object the “promotion of the progressive development of 
international law” and its “codification.”93 The terms “codification” and 
“progressive development” are defined, albeit merely for convenience, 
in Article 15 of the Statute of the Commission.94 Article 15 states that 
“progressive development of international law” is a reference to the 
 
89. See Aniruddha Rajput, Chairman of the Drafting Committee on Crimes 
Against Humanity of the International Law Commission, Statement on 




90. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Fifth Session, supra 
note 57, at Annex B. 
91. Id. ¶¶ 14–16. 
92. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Eighth Session, U.N. 
Doc. A/71/10, at 12-13 (2016). 
93. G.A. Res. 174 (II), supra note 40, art. 1. 
94. Id. art. 15. 
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“preparation of draft conventions on subjects which have not yet been 
regulated by international law or in regard to which the law has not 
yet been sufficiently developed in the practice of States.”95 In contrast, 
“codification of international law” is said to mean “the more precise 
formulation and systematization of rules of international law in fields 
where there has already been extensive State practice, precedent and 
doctrine.”96 
As a matter of principle, regarding this distinction in its founding 
instrument, the ILC has adopted a “composite” approach to its 
mandate.97 Thus, though seemingly formally bound to a division 
between progressive development and codification under Article 15 of 
its statute, the Commission has preferred to present legal texts that 
may reflect a mix of both.98 This is because, in practice and drawing on 
the experience with prior codification efforts tracing back to the pre-
ILC League of Nations period, the Commission found that it is near 
impossible to separate the two sets of tasks which were essentially 
intertwined, inter-related, and indivisible.  For that reason, as a general 
rule, the ILC has not flagged which of its provisions contained in texts 
forwarded to the General Assembly constitute one or the other.99 It has 
done so in a relatively small set  instances over a seventy-year period. 
It would, when it speaks to the point, often be content to state, at the 
outset, that the text in the package being sent to States should be 
presumed to include a mixture of both codification and progressive 
development.100 This approach seemed to generally work well. It also 
seems more protective of States law-making role since they would then, 
irrespective of the ILC classification of text as codification or 
progressive development, go on to negotiate a treaty text based on the 
Commission’s work. The ability to (re)negotiate, on the basis of the 
texts, binding conventions ensures a balance can be struck by the States 
themselves between the aspects that may reflect codification and those 




97. Charles C. Jalloh, The Role and Contributions of the International Law 
Commission to the Development of International Law, 13 F.I.U. L. REV. 
975, 979 (2019); Dire Tladi, The International Law Commission’s Recent 
Work on Exceptions to Immunity: Charting the Course for a Brave New 
World in International Law?, 32 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 169, 172 (2019). 
98. See Jalloh, supra note 97. 
99. Tladi, supra note 97, at 182. 
100. See, e.g., Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, in 
Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Third session, U.N. 
Doc. A/66/10, at 222 (2011); Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary 
Aquifers, in Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixtieth Session, 
U.N. Doc. A/63/10, at 19 (2008). 
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refinement, revision, consolidation or even development of the 
substantive law, as has happened in some cases with draft ILC texts 
prepared for the General Assembly including the 1994 draft Statute for 
a permanent international criminal court, a function that is obviously 
the legitimate purview of States as legislators of the law that bind them 
rather than the task of ILC members. The question that might now 
arise is whether this established practice should continue given the 
increasing tendency of the ILC’s current projects to be of a softer nature 
in the form of draft principles, guidelines, or conclusions rather than 
draft articles designed for possible transformation into multilateral 
conventions negotiated by States.  
Some aspects of the ILC’s first reading draft crimes against 
humanity treaty appear to go beyond codification of the existing 
customary law of crimes against humanity and may reflect its 
progressive development. Indeed, the fact that the Commission 
embarked upon the path of preparing draft articles for the crimes 
against humanity topic does not mean that the work on this or any of 
its other projects could be regarded as limited to codification of the 
existing law. Pure codification tasks will, in methodological terms, 
entail an in-depth assessment of the customary law status of each given 
rule. That would in turn call for a detailed examination of whether 
there exists a general practice among States that is accepted as law in 
relation to a given rule.  A second step would then determine whether 
the rule needs to be improved even as it is reduced into writing as part 
of the exercise of codification within the meaning of Article 15 of the 
ILC Statute. Even in the task of codification, it can be presumed to 
include minor changes or additions to clarify issues or fix gaps. As 
Professor Brierly explained well in the expert committee discussions 
preceding the creation of the ILC in relevant part: 
…codification cannot be absolutely limited to declaring existing 
law. As soon as you set out to do this, you discover that the 
existing law is uncertain, that for one reason or another there are 
gaps in it which are not covered. If you were to disregard these 
uncertainties and these gaps and simply include in your code, 
rules of existing law which are absolutely clear and certain, the 
work would have little value. Hence, the codifier, if he is 
competent for his work, will make suggestions of his own; where 
the rule is uncertain, he will suggest which is the better view; 
where a gap exists, he will suggest how it can best be filled. If he 
makes it clear what he is doing, tabulates the existing authorities, 
fairly examines the arguments pro and con, he will be doing his 
work properly. But it is true that in this aspect of his work he 
will be suggesting legislation—he will be working on the lex 
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ferenda, not the lex lata—he will be extending the law and not 
merely stating the law that already exists.101   
There are, of course, other aspects of the draft convention that 
constitute “progressive development,” as the phrase is understood in 
Article 15 of the Statute of the Commission.102 The latter provides for 
the preparation of draft conventions on subjects that have either not 
yet been regulated or encompasses situations where the law itself has 
not been sufficiently developed in State practice.103 The description of 
some provisions contained in the first reading text of crimes against 
humanity might fit the progressive development category.104 The 
extension of rules on extradition and mutual legal assistance specifically 
to crimes against humanity could be illustrations of this.105  
Yet, there is extensive practice of States in that regard in relation 
to several other (transnational) crimes.106 In fact, this example suggests 
that the distinction between codification and progressive development 
is to some extent facile, in the sense that both concepts mandated in 
Article 15 of the Commission’s statute admit of a measure of change to 
a given rule whether framed as codification or progressive 
development.107 In the present example, all that takes place is that the 
existing rule which is known in the transnational crimes context is 
extended to cover a new situation addressing atrocity crimes.108  If that 
contention is true, the question might arise whether this approach was 
sound for this specific topic. I would argue that it is for several reasons.  
 
101. HERBERT W. BRIGGS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 135 (1969). 
102. Hannes Jöbstl, An Unforeseen Pandora’s Box? Absolute Non-
Refoulement Obligations Under Article 5 of the ILC Draft Articles on 
Crimes Against Humanity, EJIL: TALK! (May 5, 2019), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/category/international-criminal-law/crimes-
against-humanity/ [https://perma.cc/JJ69-N542]. 
103. G.A. Res. 174 (II), supra note 40, art. 15. 
104. See Jöbstl, supra note 102. 
105. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra 
note 35, at 15–17. 
106. See, e.g., U.N. OFF. OF DRUGS & CRIME, Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA), 
https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/organized-crime/module-11/key-
issues/mutual-legal-assistance.html [https://perma.cc/7KFW-7UGT]. 
107. See Sean D. Murphy, Codification, Progressive Development, or Scholarly 
Analysis? The Art of Packaging the ILC’s Work Product, GEO. WASH. L. 
(Oct. 27, 2012), 
https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1915&amp;
context=faculty_publications [https://perma.cc/GWS4-6WN5]. 
108. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra 
note 35, at 15–17. 
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First, given the nature of the subject matter, especially the gravity 
of the crimes under consideration. A related point, already mentioned 
above, is the virtually inseparable nature of the task of codification 
from the task of progressive development.109  
Second, although there is some practice to investigate and 
prosecute these crimes within international tribunals such as the ICTY, 
the ICTR, the SCSL, and the ICC, there is relatively more limited State 
practice concerning the investigation and prosecution of such crimes at 
the national level and within national courts.110 Yet, at least indirectly, 
the practice of international courts set up to prosecute crimes against 
humanity would be relevant,111 more so where the law in this area has 
been developed by the judges of those courts without objection from 
States.  
Third, and relatedly, since the ILC crimes against humanity project 
was partly justified as a gap filling convention, there is, ultimately, a 
need for an effective regime at the national level for the prevention and 
punishment of crimes against humanity.112 This apparently requires a 
study of treaties which are highly developed in respect of transnational 
crimes. Those treaties, which contain rules reflecting codification and 
those that reflect progressive development, may offer useful models for 
crimes against humanity. In such circumstances, rather than emphasize 
which aspect of its draft articles constitute progressive development 
and which reflect codification of existing law, the Commission 
necessarily blends the two to advance draft articles deemed to be useful, 
effective, and likely to find acceptance among a broad range of States.113 
This would include parties or non-parties to the ICC Statute. 
In a nutshell, both for principled and pragmatic reasons, the draft 
crimes against humanity articles adopted on first reading in 2017 
conform to the long-standing practice of the Commission.114 As the 
study itself aims at producing a draft convention, which contains 
elements of existing law and elements of proposals for progressive 
development of the law, the Commission enjoys some freedom to 
suggest provisions based primarily on whether they are expected to be 
 
109. Murphy, Codification, Progressive Development, or Scholarly Analysis?, 
supra note 107, at 2. 
110. See Murphy, First Rep., supra note 62, at 15, 18, 25, 31. 
111. Rep. on Seventieth Session, supra note 12, at 130–31. 
112. See Anturo J. Carrillo & Annalise Nelson, Comparative Law Study and 
Analysis of National Legislation Relating to Crimes Against Humanity 
and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 46 GEO. WASH. INT’L L.R. 481, 482 
(2014). 
113. See Jalloh, supra note 97. 
114. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra 
note 35, at 9-10. 
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useful and effective in the prohibition and punishment of crimes against 
humanity.115 Thus, it seems plausible that some of the provisions will 
go beyond existing law, that is to say, beyond codification as defined 
under the Statute. The safeguard for States is that, if they take forward 
the draft convention, they would negotiate the text and make it their 
own irrespective whether some of the proposed provisions are 
restatements of customary law and others amount to progressive 
development. Once satisfied, they can through signature, ratification 
and accession express their consent to be bound by the obligations 
contained within it. In such circumstances, where the guding 
consideration will be on whether they are establishing a workable legal 
regime to prohibit and punish crimes against humanity, it seems not as 
material for each specific draft article to reflect the lex lata.  
With the above context in mind, let us now proceed to assess the 
form and substance of the ILC’s draft crimes against humanity articles 
adopted by the Commission on first reading in 2017. Two brief 
observations seem warranted. First, the first draft crimes against 
humanity convention consists of a preamble, 15 draft articles, and a 
draft annex, all of which are accompanied by commentary.116 Though 
perhaps an unfair comparison, this is a much shorter and more compact 
instrument, compared to the 19 clauses of the 1948 Genocide 
Convention and between the 63 and 163 clauses and several annexes of 
the four separate Geneva Conventions.117  
Second, and focusing on substance, even a cursory review would 
show that the draft crimes against humanity articles reflect many 
benefits of having a standalone treaty. It compares favorably, and in 
nearly all respects, improves upon the Geneva and Genocide 
Convention frameworks. The duty to prevent and the duty to punish 
are both given great weight.118 The draft convention also contemplates 
strong mini-extradition and mutual legal assistance regimes that are 
missing from the war crimes and genocide conventions.119 For the latter 
reason, it would have been beneficial for the Commission to broaden 
the crimes against humanity project to also include war crimes and 
genocide in its study.   
 
115. See Murphy, First Rep., supra note 62, at 7, 8. 
116. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra 
note 35, at 10. 
117. Genocide Convention, supra note 60; Geneva I, supra note 60; Geneva IV, 
supra note 60. 
118. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra 
note 35, at 11–13. 
119. Id. at 15–17. 
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C. Draft Article 1—Scope of the Draft Articles 
Besides the preambular paragraphs, which among other things 
recognize that the prohibition of crimes against humanity is a 
peremptory norm of general international law and that it is the duty of 
States to exercise their criminal jurisdiction over the crime, this opening 
provision, which is standard in ILC draft texts, sets the stage for the 
whole project. It provides that “[t]he present draft articles apply to the 
prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity.”120 The thrust 
looks both to the future and to the past. Future in the sense that, by 
criminalizing crimes against humanity, it seeks to prevent them from 
being committed.121 In terms of the past, when crimes have been or are 
being committed, it seeks to create a mechanism that would require 
States to take measures to prevent others who would otherwise carry 
them out.122   
Regrettably, although crimes against humanity, genocide, war 
crimes and the crime of aggression are typically committed together, 
the draft instrument does not encompass those other grave crimes.123 
To have covered war crimes and genocide would have broadened the 
scope of the ILC’s project. Nonetheless, it would have better addressed 
the realities of international crimes by providing a regime for horizontal 
cooperation on extradition and mutual legal assistance than solely 
addressing the single crime. Incidentally, although the ILC decided to 
limit its work to only crimes against humanity, several States have 
initiated a separate project that would encompass at least three of the 
four core crimes under international law.124  
D. Draft Article 2—General Obligation 
Article 2 essentially provides that States undertake both to prevent 
and to punish crimes against humanity, which are crimes under 
international law, whether committed in peace time or during 
wartime.125 The first part of the provision can be said to constitute 
codification.126 The ILC had, in some of its prior work, concluded that 
crimes against humanity were clearly prohibited as a crime under 
 
120. Id. at 10. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 11. 
124. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, 
supra note 35, at 110. 
125. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra 
note 85, at 11. 
126. See id. 
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international law since there is an extensive body of State practice 
prohibiting the crime dating back to at least 1945.127 The latter 
obligation in Article 2, which entails the element of prevention of crimes 
against humanity, may constitute progressive development even if it 
logically follows from the ambition of punishment.128  
In advancing this provision, the Special Rapporteur provided 
multiple treaty references including the 1948 Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1950 Principles 
of International Law recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg 
Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal, 1954 Draft Code of 
Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1968 Convention 
on the non-applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, and others.129 Although, none of those 
instruments included the exact language of Article 2, the Special 
Rapporteur emphasized that the 1948 Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, with 150 State signatories, 
as a similar convention which represents that States bear an obligation 
to prosecute and prevent these crimes of atrocity which are punishable 
during times of armed conflict, and times of peace.130 The Genocide 
Convention, which contains the duty of prevention in relation to that 
crime, is usually considered to be part of customary international law.131 
As a crime analogous to a crime against humanity, and considering the 
subsequent developments in international criminal law since 1948, an 
extension of this obligation to cover this crime is warranted.132   
The text of the preventative part of the provision seems well 
anchored by its alignment with the analogous obligation set forth in 
Article 1133 of the 1948 Genocide Convention via use of the words 
“undertake to” rather than “shall,” and identifies crimes against 
humanity as “crimes under international law,” an expression previously 
used by the ILC, for example in Article 1, paragraph 2 of the 1996 Draft 
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind.134 The 
assertion in this draft article that crimes against humanity are crimes 
 
127. Murphy, First Rep., supra note 62, at 20. 
128. Forteau, supra note 83, at 3–5. 
129. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra 
note 35, at 26–27, 30, 45. 
130. Id. at 45. 
131. Genocide, U.N. OFF. ON GENOCIDE PREVENTION AND THE RESP. TO 
PROTECT, https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/6L2A-EG7Q]. 
132. Murphy, First Rep., supra note 62, at 6–7. 
133. Genocide Convention, supra note 60, at 280. 
134. Peace and Security, supra note 30, at 17. 
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under international law affirms the prohibition of crimes against 
humanity exists, even if not included in national law. The aspect 
concerning “whether or not committed in time of armed conflict”135 is 
also important due, firstly, to the long debate among international 
criminal lawyers about the so-called conflict nexus, and secondly, the 
fact that the origins of the crime in an international armed conflict 
(World War II) does not mean it has not been recognized as also 
prohibited in the context of internal armed conflicts under customary 
law. As explained by the Chairperson of the Drafting Committee in 
relation to the conflict nexus which is now settled: 
The Drafting Committee considered it important to maintain this 
element from the original proposal by the Special Rapporteur in 
view of the historic evolution of the definition of crimes against 
humanity. As explained in the First Report, these crimes were 
originally linked to the existence of an armed conflict in the 
context of the Nürnberg Tribunal. Customary international law 
has developed since then, and it is now firmly established that no 
such connection is required. 136 [Emphasis added]. 
The important duty to prevent crimes against humanity is further 
explained in the Commission’s commentary, and was also addressed in 
later substantive provisions of the draft articles.137 Unresolved issues 
concerning this provision will include the scope and depth of the duty 
of prevention, in particular, whether it applies only internally in the 
concerned State or also externally in relation to other States.138 
Consideration of this will presumably account for the more recent 
developments concerning the responsibility to protect which was 
endorsed in relation to crimes against humanity by the UN General 
Assembly in 2005.139 The duty to prevent, as important as it is, would 
seem to be implicit in the prohibition of crimes against humanity but 
may be a form of progressive development.     
 
135. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra 
note 35, at 11; Forteau, supra note 83, at 5. 
136. Forteau, supra note 83, at 5. 
137. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra 
note 35, at 25–28. 
138. See William A. Schabas, Prevention of Crimes Against Humanity, 16 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 705, 714-21 (2018) (discussing the background and 
various interpretations of prevention provisions throughout the history of 
the ILC). 
139. G.A. Res. 60/1, at 30 (Sept. 16, 2005). 
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E. Draft Article 3—Definition of Crimes against Humanity 
The first reading crimes against humanity text also provides, in 
four paragraphs, a single definition of crimes against humanity.140 This 
should help develop the type of definitional coherence we see for the 
crime of genocide and war crimes but that has been abjectly missing 
for crimes against humanity.141 In terms of origin, the first three 
paragraphs of this article essentially reproduced Article 7 of the Rome 
Statute, which incidentally, did not purport to reflect the customary 
international law definition of crimes against humanity when the treaty 
was negotiated in 1998.142 The preference for the ICC definition stems 
from the view within the Commission, both in Plenary and Drafting 
Committee, that the crimes against humanity definition in the Rome 
Statute should not be altered for the purposes of the draft articles.143 
This approach, which also apparently reflected the preference of some 
States Parties to the Rome Statute in the General Assembly, seemed 
uncontroversial within the Commission and was a pragmatic choice 
that was also stressed in the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the 
first reading text recalling the ICC definition.144  
At the same time, though the Commission’s settled methodology in 
preparation of draft articles is a more integrated approach, the adoption 
of Article 7 should have provoked a more robust discussion. This might 
have included consideration of whether the definitional provision was a 
codification or progressive development of international criminal law, 
especially given the differing definitions of this crime since the 
Nuremberg Tribunal. The discussion would be important because the 
definition of the crime has potentially far reaching implications about 
the scope of the prohibition and therefore the reach of the crime. There 
are also diverging views among jurists on the customary law status of 
the Rome Statute definition, with most authorities and ad hoc courts 
concluding that the ICC Statute is much narrower than customary 
international law.145 The difficulty was implicitly recognized. Thus, 
although only directed at definitions found in national legislation and 
 
140. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra 
note 35, at 11–12. 
141. See id. at 21. 
142. Id. at 29. 
143. Forteau, supra note 83, at 6. 
144. See Murphy, First Rep., supra note 62, at 57–58. 
145. See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, Crimes Against Humanity, in THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 373 
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in other international instruments, the Commission included a savings 
clause in paragraph 4 to the borrowed definition from Article 7 of the 
ICC Statute.146 That fourth paragraph clarifies that the draft article is 
without prejudice to any broader definition of crimes against humanity 
provided in any international instrument or national law.147  
This without prejudice clause also allowed the ILC to set aside 
potentially positive developments in the definition of crimes against 
humanity since the Rome Statute was adopted in July 1998, in relation 
to for example, the subset crime of enforced disappearance that now 
has a standalone treaty concluded in 2006. The issue was explained as 
follows:  
[T]he definition adopted for these draft articles has no effect upon 
broader definitions that may exist currently in other instruments, 
such as the 2006 International Convention for the Protection of 
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, or in national laws . . 
. [and which] also makes clear that the present draft articles have 
no effect on the adoption, in the future, of a broader definition of 
crimes against humanity in an international instrument or a 
national law.148 
Interestingly, although there were references to definitions of crimes 
against humanity under national law or other international 
instruments, the without prejudice clause was virtually silent regarding 
customary international law.149 That omission was surprising 
considering that custom is one of the most important sources of law 
with serious implications for national jurisdictions and their prohibition 
of crimes against humanity.150 It is even more surprising since the 
Commission was simultaneously also undertaking a separate study on 
identification of customary international law.151 In States that would 
have incorporated the crime, through national legislation, the 
prosecution of the crime would be possible as paragraph 4 captured 
their scenario.152 For those States that have the possibility of doing so 
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under customary law, without first having passed legislation, the 
omission in the without prejudice clause of customary law would pose 
some legal difficulties. The ILC will presumably revisit this aspect 
during the second reading on the topic.  
There is a further concern about the ILC definition that is more 
forward-looking than backward-looking. What the Commission does 
should not in any way inhibit the growth of the customary law of crimes 
against humanity.153 Ironically, even the ICC Statute, from which the 
ILC crimes against humanity definition is borrowed, two points make 
the intention of States not to disturb customary law crystal clear. First, 
the opening formulation of Article 7 of the Rome Statute, uses the 
language of “for the purpose of this Statute”.154 This phrase was 
included to avoid any doubts about the specific crimes against 
humanity definition in the context of the establishment of a permanent 
ICC.155  
Second, in Article 10 of the ICC Statute, States were unequivocal 
that their preference for a particular definition of crimes against 
humanity for the specific purposes of the Rome Statute was not to be 
interpreted “as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing 
rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute”, 
meaning outside the ICC context.156 The ILC took note of Article 10 in 
its commentary to Article 3 but could also have taken on board 
developments in international law since the Rome Statute was 
negotiated in July 1998.157 Elements of the definition of the crime, for 
example in relation to enforced disappearances as a crime against 
humanity, has since been phrased in a way that is much broader than 
the definition actually included in Article 7, paragraph 2(i), of the Rome 
Statute in Article 2 of the 2006 International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons against Enforced Disappearance.158  
We shall return to these and related concerns about the use of the 
ICC definition in Part IV of the present article.  For now, it can be 
concluded that the definition of crimes against humanity contained in 
the first reading text is closer to an exercise in codification rather than 
 
153. See G.A. Res. 174 (II), supra note 40, art. 1; Leila Nadya Sadat, Custom, 
Codification and Some Thoughts About the Relationship Between the 
Two: Article 10 of the ICC Statute, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 909, 910–11 
(2000). 
154. Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 7. 
155. See id. 
156. See Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 10; see also Sadat, supra note 153, 
at 910–11. 
157. See Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 125. 
158. See International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance, Dec. 20, 2006, 2176 U.N.T.S. 3 (the article 2 
“enforced disappearance”).  
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progressive development – to the extent that most (though not all) of 
the elements contained in the Rome Statute definition would appear to 
be part of customary international law.  
F. Draft Article 4—Obligation of Prevention 
One of the most important features of the first reading text is the 
duty to prevent crimes against humanity. Draft Article 4, composed of 
two paragraphs, provides one of the most significant advances when it 
requires that each State undertakes to prevent crimes against 
humanity, in conformity with international law, through the adoption 
of various measures in any territory under its jurisdiction. It would 
establish an independent duty, from that of the duty to punish, to 
prevent crimes against humanity including  mandating States to 
affirmatively adopt “effective legislative, administrative, judicial or 
other preventive measure in any territory under its jurisdiction” and 
“cooperate with other States, relevant intergovernmental organizations 
and, as appropriate, other organizations” to prevent crimes against 
humanity.  
The ILC Article 4 complements Article 2 and makes the case why 
certain acts, which qualify as crimes against humanity, already require 
States to engage in proactive measures of prevention. The comparison 
was made to certain other widely condemned crimes such as genocide, 
apartheid, enforced disappearances, and torture. The prohibition of 
those crimes requires States to take preventive measures. By parity of 
reasoning, even if the obligation did not exist in relation to all the acts 
that comprise crimes against humanity, it was felt necessary to extend 
it to also cover such crimes since all of those crimes are themselves 
crimes against humanity when committed in the context of a 
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population. Here, 
a strict line dividing codification from progressive development might 
have required separating the three underlying acts for which there are 
independent treaties to the extent that those could be said to constitute 
customary law (i.e. torture, enforced disappearances and apartheid) 
from the rest of the eight others that constitute crimes against 
humanity (i.e. murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, 
imprisonment, rape, persecution, other inhumane acts). 
Most of the rest of these crimes, for instance, murder, enslavement, 
imprisonment, rape and persecution are so prevalent in virtually all 
States that it will be hard for them not to constitute forms of 
codification even if one might have to fill a gap to derive the duty to 
prevent them in addition to the duty to punish. The autonomous duty 
to prevent crimes against humanity is also consistent with the practice 
of States in concluding numerous largely suppression treaties, especially 
since the 1960s, that feature a duty to take steps to prevent particular 
crimes such as terrorism, human trafficking and hostage taking.  
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To justify the argument for prevention, reliance was also placed on 
multilateral human rights treaties establishing obligations to prevent 
human rights violations though it was recognized that these were not 
necessarily penal in nature. Reference was also made to the 
jurisprudence of international courts, most notably, the International 
Court of Justice which has found the duty to prevent and the duty to 
punish are distinct but connected obligations.159 All would support the 
commonsense position that, like the case for genocide, States can be 
asked to undertake the duty to prevent crimes against humanity. In 
the commentary, the Commission went on to explain what exactly 
prevention would entail. Here, it relied on a four-part duty for States 
based on the ICJ judgment in relation to Genocide which was viewed 
as naturally extending to crimes against humanity.160 The ICJ, as part 
of this, reasoned that the duty to prevent genocide is not necessarily 
territorially limited, meaning that the similar duty could apply to 
crimes against humanity in areas under both de facto and de jure 
control of the State concerned.161    
As framed, this provision would require States to develop 
mechanisms which they may use to promote the prevention of crimes 
against humanity.162 The majority of the language for Article 4 (1) (a) 
and the commentary concerning the treatment of the duty to prevent 
crimes against humanity broadly followed and applied to this crime 
derive from the findings of the ICJ in relation to the interpretation of 
this same obligation under Article 1 of the Genocide Convention in the 
Bosnia Genocide Case. The obligation of prevention being placed on 
States is important and would be read in light of the circumstances and 
the risks they are being confronted with at the time as well as their 
capacity to influence the course of events.163 Measures taken, of course, 
must remain in full conformity with international law.164 In other words, 
a State may not violate international law and unlawfully use force in 
the name of preventing crimes against humanity.165  
The duty to take preventive measures could be seen as a form of 
codification, or perhaps more plausibly, as a form of progressive 
development. The Commission, without drawing such a distinction, 
 
159. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro), 
Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 42, ¶¶ 430–431 (Feb. 26). 
160. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, supra 
note 35, at 49–51, 54. 
161. Id. at 53–54. 
162. Id. at 51. 
163. Rep. on Sixty-Seventh Session, supra note 11, at 53. 
164. Id.  
165. Id. 
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essentially derived the obligation to prevent from a combined reading 
of State practice, jurisprudence and the established prohibition 
providing for punishment of those who commit crimes against 
humanity. This in a way represents the consolidation of a body of law 
on crimes against humanity that first emerged in the immediate 
aftermath of World War II and that extends through to the modern 
period with the establishment of the UN international tribunals as well 
as various prosecutions of the crime within national courts. Yet, in 
many ways, the categorization of the draft article may not be as 
significant. This is because, as with the case of the Genocide 
Convention, there is no automatic extension of the obligation of 
prevention onto States until a convention containing this express 
obligation is adopted.  The safeguard for States remains in that they 
would have to choose to negotiate and then join such a convention and 
to give their consent in relation to the duty to prevent before it would 
apply to them from the point of entry into force.166  
Paragraph two of the draft article forecloses any exceptional 
circumstances as justifications for the crime.167 This paragraph was 
inspired by but is not entirely identical with article 2, paragraph 2 of 
the Convention against Torture.168 The provision was naturally tweaked 
to better fit the crimes against humanity context. As the Chair of the 
Drafting Committee explained, “it was thought that an advantage of 
this formulation with respect to crimes against humanity is that it is 
drafted in a manner that can speak to the conduct of either State or 
non-State actors.”169  
G. Draft Article 5—Non-Refoulement 
Draft Article 5, which is in some respects also preventive, 
contemplates in paragraph 1 that no person is to be expelled, returned 
(refoulér), surrendered or extradited to a State to “territory under the 
jurisdiction of another State where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to a 
crime against humanity.”170 This language is largely derived from the 
2006 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance. But the textual addition of “territory under” 
has the effect of narrowing down the version included in the draft crimes 
 
166. United Nations, Towards Universal Participation and Implementation 
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167. Rep. on Sixty-Seventh Session, supra note 11, at 53. 
168. Id. 
169. Forteau, supra note 83. 
170. Rep. on Sixty-Ninth Session, supra note 35, at 12. 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) 
The International Law Commission’s First Draft Convention on Crimes 
Against Humanity 
364 
against humanity text.171 The focus should be on the change of 
jurisdiction which is not necessarily coextensive with territory.   
The second paragraph of Draft Article 5 requires States to examine 
factors triggerring non-refoulement; such grounds are broad and would 
require taking into account “all relevant considerations, including, 
where applicable, the existence in the territory under the jurisdiction 
of the State concern of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass 
violations of human rights or of serious violations of international 
humanitarian law.”172 This clause, or close variants of it, has previously 
been included in a number of international and regional treaties 
including: the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and 
the 1984 Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.173 Nonetheless, and appropriately 
so in my view, no exceptions to the prohibition of non-refoulement 
similar to that found in refugee law allowing the return of a refugee 
who has committed a particularly serious crime or deemed to be a 
national security risk was incorporated in the context of crimes against 
humanity.174  
A wider formulation of this duty was already included in the 
Commission’s own project on diplomatic protection.175 The use of 
certain limiting language, concerning the formula regarding the 
“territory under the jurisdiction of” raises a number of concerns that 
might merit revisiting during the second reading stage. A related issue 
is whether, if a person is in danger of crimes against humanity, the 
obligation should be limited to assessing only that risk. Surely, it would 
be more consistent with the letter and spirit of the provision if the 
States concerned are required to assess the potential risk also in relation 
to other crimes. It is unclear whether the individual can be deported to 
a situation where other international crimes, such as war crimes or 
genocide or even other non-criminal gross human rights violations, are 
being committed. In the end, given that most of Draft Article 5 matches 
existing law and is found in numerous treaties and other instruments 
already widely accepted by States, it can be seen as a codification of an 
existing and fundamental rule of international law that prohibits 
 
171. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, supra note 158, art. 9(1)(a). 
172. Rep. on Sixty-Ninth Session, supra note 35, at 12. 
173. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S. 137; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 86. 
174. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 173.  
175. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 31, at 17. 
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against refoulement. The rule is even sometimes said to possess a jus 
cogens character.176  
H. Draft Article 6—Criminalization under National Law 
Draft Article 6 requires States to take measures to ensure that 
crimes against humanity are criminalized under their national law, 
which – if followed – would do much to prevent crimes against 
humanity from occurring.177 This draft article, which seems like a mix 
of codification and progressive development, further obliges States to 
address in their national laws the liability of others as well: for various 
modes of liability, including committing, attempting, ordering; to 
provide for command or superior responsibility; and provide 
appropriate penalties for the gravity of the crimes; the liability of legal 
persons; while providing that liability would follow despite official 
position of a person, which would not serve to exclude the person from 
criminal responsibility and affirming the inapplicability of a statute of 
limitations and the superior orders defense for such crimes.178 
Specifically, given divergent definitions of the crime in national 
laws, draft article 6 is significant in mandating that States take the 
necessary measures to ensure that crimes against humanity are 
criminalized under their national law as such, and equally importantly, 
that they ensure that such measures cannot be defeated by pleas to 
procedural bars that might otherwise gut the essence of the 
prohibition.179 The Special Rapporteur believed that State practice 
regarding the liability of legal persons for the offences referred to in the 
draft articles was varied.180 The idea of corporate criminal liability for 
crimes against humanity and other atrocity crimes was mooted but was 
not taken forward during the 1998 negotiations of the Rome Statute. 
More recently, in the African Union, African States adopted the Malabo 
Protocol providing for the criminal liability of legal persons.181 
Interestingly, the provision contemplates the application of such 
 
176. Id. at 22. 
177. Rep. on Sixty-Ninth Session, supra note 35, at 13. 
178. Id. 
179. Id.  
180. Int’l Law Comm’n, Provisional summary record of the 3296th mtg., Sixty-
eighth session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3296, at 9 (2016). 
181. See article 46, African Union, Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol 
on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, adopted 
by the Twenty-third Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government, 27 June 2014 (15 signatories as of this writing but not 
yet in force).   
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liability for both transnational182 crimes and crimes against humanity 
as well as a longer list of international crimes than the four contained 
in the ICC Statute.183 
However, even if that practice varies and could be insufficient to 
reach the threshold of codification, several members of the Commission 
highlighted the need for a provision requiring the establishment of 
liability of legal persons for crimes against humanity.184 There was 
considerable support in the Plenary discussions of the Commission for 
the inclusion of a provision of this kind, to account for new realities of 
legal persons being accomplices or aiders and abettors to the 
commission of mass violations of human rights, and in some cases, even 
crimes against humanity.185 There are no doubt various parts of this 
provision that are forms of progressive development. There are also 
other parts, especially the modes of liability, that may already have 
sufficient rooting in customary international law.186  
It is regrettable that the ILC, though relying on the individual 
criminal responsibility clause set out in Article 25(3) of the Rome 
Statute for inspiration, did not include other established modes of 
liability such as inciting/incitement and conspiracy, for crimes against 
humanity, both of which are found in its own prior and well-known 
work on the Draft Code of Crimes and in the Genocide Convention.187 
Incitement as a form of accessorial liability seems well rooted in 
customary international law.188 It is a vital form of criminal 
 
182. The distinction between international and transnational crimes is, of 
course, not always clear. See Charles C. Jalloh, “The Distinction Between 
“International” and “Transnational” Crimes in the African Criminal 
Court”, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO TRANSNATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMES, 272 (Harmen Van der Wilt & Christophe Paulussen eds., 2017). 
183. THE AFRICAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: 
DEVELOPMENT AND CHALLENGES (Charles Jalloh, Kamari Clarke & 
Vincent Nmehielle eds., 2019). See, in particular, Chapter 27 on Article 
46C by Joanna Kyriakakis.  
184. Int’l Law Comm’n, Provisional summary record of the 3300th mtg., Sixty-
eighth session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3300, at 14 (2016). 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 3. 
187. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, art. 
III(b)-(c), Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
188. See TERJE EINARSEN & JOSEPH RIKHOF, A THEORY OF PUNISHABLE 
PARTICIPATION IN UNIVERSAL CRIMES (2018) 257-304 (providing a 
thoughtful critique pointing out inconsistencies in the ILC’s approach to 
modes of liability including in relation to the crimes against humanity 
project).  
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participation in relation to genocide,189 and given the systemic nature 
of such core crimes, also in relation to crimes against humanity.190 This 
mode of criminal participation is reflected in extensive State practice 
and in the practice of international criminal courts that have prosecuted 
crimes against humanity.191 Interestingly, the ILC departs from its 
earlier work by omitting both incitement and conspiracy from the draft 
crimes against humanity articles. 
I. Draft Article 7—Establishment of National Jurisdiction 
Draft article 7 addresses the obligation of States to establish 
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity in certain circumstances. It 
provides, in relevant part, that “[e]ach State shall take the necessary 
measures to establish its jurisdiction over the offences covered by the 
present draft articles . . . .”192 Its three subsections delineate the 
circumstances under which States shall take the necessary measures to 
establish jurisdiction: territorial jurisdiction, active personality 
jurisdiction, and passive personality jurisdiction.193 In order to properly 
appreciate this draft article, the contents must be explained prior to 
the analysis. Though it can already be said that the bulk of this would 
appear to be a form of codification even if there are also aspects that 
could be read as progressive development.  
First, territorial jurisdiction is based on the location of the crime. 
This subsection provides a basis to assert territorial jurisdiction “when 
the offence is committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or on 
board a ship or aircraft registered in that State.”194 
Second, active personality jurisdiction is a common form of 
jurisdiction in national law based on the nationality of the alleged 
offender. This subsection provides for the assertion of jurisdiction 
“when the alleged offender is a national of that State or, if that State 
considers it appropriate, a stateless person who habitually resides in 
that State’s territory.”195  
Third, passive personality provides the final basis on which to 
assert jurisdiction. Passive personality has been described as 
 
189. See for the pernicious role of incitement in fomenting atrocity crimes, 
Gregory S. Gordon, ATROCITY SPEECH LAW: FOUNDATION, 
FRAGMENTATION, FRUITION (2017). 
190. Id. 
191. See generally Wibke Kristin Timmermann, Incitement in international 
criminal law, 88 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 164, 823-852 (2006).  
192. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 32, ch. IV, art. 7(1)(a). 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. art. 7(1)(b). 
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controversial by some academics even though it exists in several 
national criminal systems. This final subsection provides that 
jurisdiction may be asserted “when the victim is a national of that State 
. . . .”196 National law is instrumental regarding this subsection because 
it will provide the definition.197  
Moving on to paragraph two of the same draft article, which 
provides that: “[e]ach State shall also take necessary measures to 
establish jurisdiction over the offences covered by the present draft 
articles . . . where the alleged offender is present in any territory under 
its jurisdiction and it does not extradite or surrender the person . . . 
.”198 This paragraph, which in some respects is residual in character to 
encompass situations not covered by the earlier grounds of jurisdiction, 
creates a duty for States to establish such jurisdiction. No prior 
territorial or active or passive personality connection to the crime is 
required. The provision contemplates situations where a suspect, say in 
an attempt to find safe haven, becomes present in a State Party having 
no other connections to the offense. However, the draft articles  consider 
the possibility that a State may extradite or surrender the alleged 
offender, which is addressed in greater detail in other draft articles 
specifically article 9.199  
Next, the third and final paragraph of article 7 makes clear that 
“the exercise of criminal jurisdiction established by a State in 
accordance with its national law” is not excluded when using other 
jurisdictional grounds that may be available to it.200 For instance, the 
exercise of jurisdiction on the basis of universal jurisdiction for crimes 
against humanity would be permissible. The Commission did not 
explicitly say anything on this, which might strike the reader as odd 
given the widespread acceptance by States of the existence of universal 
jurisdiction for crimes against humanity. At the same time, given earlier 
ILC work in this regard, it was understood that the omission of the 
reference did not constitute a departure from its earlier works on the 
subject.201 Indeed, under Article 8 of the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind, the Commission was clear 
that it would be up to States to establish broad forms of jurisdiction 
 
196. Id. art. 7(1)(c). 
197. For further comments on article 7, see Antonio Coco, The Universal Duty 
to Establish Jurisdiction over and Investigate Crimes Against Humanity: 
Preliminary Remarks on Draft Articles 7, 8, 9, and 11 by the International 
Law Commission, 16 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 751, 761 (2018). 
198. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 35, ch. IV, Article 7(2). 
199. Id. art. 9(1). 
200. Id. ch. IV, art. 7(3). 
201. See id. 
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over atrocity crimes, including crimes against humanity, “irrespective 
of where or by whom those crimes were committed.”202 It can thus be 
concluded that the universality principle remains a viable jurisdictional 
basis for the investigation and punishment of crimes against humanity.  
Since it appears that there is universal criminal jurisdiction for 
crimes against humanity under customary international law, consistent 
with the views of many States as expressed before the Sixth Committee, 
article 7 could be misread as restricting the “combined approach to 
jurisdiction based on the broadest jurisdiction of national courts” 
envisioned by the ILC in 1996 in commentary paragraph (2) to article 
8 of the draft code.203 Indeed, according to the Commission, “The phrase 
“irrespective of where or by whom those crimes were committed” is 
used in the first provision of the article to avoid any doubt as to the 
existence of universal jurisdiction for those crimes.”204 Additionally, this 
broad concept of universal jurisdiction finds support in international 
and domestic law and in other scholarly and other works as evidenced 
by, for instance, Principles 1 of both the Princeton Principles and the 
Madrid-Buenos Aires Principles of Universal Jurisdiction.205 
J. Draft Article 8—Investigation 
Article 8 mandates that, when there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that acts constituting crimes against humanity have been or are 
being committed on their territory, the competent authorities of a State 
must take measures to ensure a prompt and impartial investigation.206 
This approach, of directing the issue of investigation to the States that 
may have crimes against humanity occurring in their territory, is in line 
with existing international instruments, such as the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment—article 12 of which provides a base for the formulation of 
 
202. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-
Eighth Session, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 10, at 110–11, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 
(1996), reprinted in [1996] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1, 29, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1 (Part 2). 
203. Id. at 205. 
204. Id. at 29. 
205. See The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, Princeton 
Program in Law and Public Policy (2001) 
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/princeton.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9KSN-GWR6]l; FIBGAR, International Congress on 
Universal Jurisdiction: Dissemination of the Madrid-Buenos Aires 
Principles on Universal Jurisdiction (Sept. 10, 2015), 
https://fibgar.org/upload/proyectos/35/en/principles-of-universal-
jurisdiction.pdf [https://perma.cc/NT99-CP84]. 
206. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 35, ch. IV, art. 8. 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) 
The International Law Commission’s First Draft Convention on Crimes 
Against Humanity 
370 
draft article 7.207 Torture, when committed in a widespread or 
systematic context, is a  crime against humanity.208  
More expressly, article 8 relates to a States’ obligation to promptly 
and impartially investigate offences constituting crimes against 
humanity “in any territory under its jurisdiction.”209 To avoid 
unnecessary confusion, it could be explained in the commentary that 
the intention was to also encompass situations where there is both de 
facto and de jure exercise of such jurisdiction.210  Undoubtedly, when 
crimes against humanity occur, the “competent authorities” of States 
have an obligation to proceed to a prompt and impartial investigation. 
However, neither the commentary, nor the text, of this draft article 
define or explain the term “competent authorities.”211  
Competent authorities may be read narrowly as including only the 
law enforcement authorities of a State. It could also be read more 
broadly to encompass other types of judicial or quasi-judicial bodies 
created by a State to investigate or document atrocity crimes. 
Consequently, it would seem beneficial for the commentary to clarify 
whether quasi-judicial investigations such as special commissions of 
inquiry or truth commissions are encompassed in this draft article. 
Further, it may not be entirely clear whether competent authorities are 
only the law enforcement bodies, or as is typical in some States, would 
encompass investigative branches of the judiciary especially in civil law 
jurisdictions.  
Questions that may arise about this provision concern the use of 
terms, for example, whether thorough should also be used, rather than 
only “prompt and impartial investigation” as currently worded.212 The 
formulation could then become “prompt, thorough and impartial 
investigation.”213 Further, investigations should only qualify if they are 
carried out in good faith. Sham investigations that are intended to 
shield or exonerate the suspects should not qualify. One might also 
query about the type of knowledge that would trigger such an 
investigation. I tend to the view that a State’s duty to ensure its 
competent authorities investigate should be automatically triggered as 
soon as the State simply becomes aware of the commission of crimes 
against humanity. In the end, as to classification, it seems hard to put 
 
207. Id. art. 12. 
208. Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 7(1)(f). 
209. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 35, ch. IV, art. 8. 
210. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-
Eighth Session, supra note 202, at 212. 
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this provision into the category of codification or progressive 
development. The reality is that, while this draft article seemingly 
consolidates the implicit duty to investigate norm found in 
international and regional human rights treaties as well as penal 
instruments (torture) and applies it explicitly to crimes against 
humanity, it could be a mix of codification and progressive 
development. At the same time, since extensive State practice, 
precedent and doctrine seems lacking, within the codification meaning 
of Article 15 of the ILC Statute, it may more plausibly be a form of 
progressive development.214      
K. Draft Article 9—Preliminary Measures When an Alleged Offender 
is Present 
Article 9 provides that States have a duty, when an alleged offender 
is present in their territory, to take preliminary measures such as 
placing the suspect in custody or taking other legal measures.215 For the 
most part, draft article 9, which is comprised of three separate 
paragraphs, is a replica of article 6 of the Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.216  
In the first paragraph, it  provides that where the circumstances so 
warrant “any State in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person 
alleged to have committed any offence covered by the present draft 
articles is present shall take the person into custody or take other legal 
measures to ensure his or her presence. The custody and other legal 
measures shall be as provided in the law of that State, but may be 
continued only for such time as is necessary to enable any criminal, 
extradition or surrender proceedings to be instituted.”217  
In the second paragraph, “[s]uch State shall immediately make a 
preliminary inquiry into the facts.” Finally, in the third paragraph, 
when the State “has taken a person into custody, it shall immediately 
 
214. Sarah M. H. Nouwen, Is there Something Missing in the Proposed 
Convention on Crimes Against Humanity? A Political Question for States 
and a Doctrinal One for the International Law Commission, 16 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 877, 908 (2018) (arguing that the ILC in recalling the duty 
of States to exercise their criminal jurisdiction over crimes against 
humanity in the preamble has implicitly determined that the duty of 
every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over crimes against 
humanity exists without necessarily providing the basis for that 
conclusion, and thus, that the approach to the crimes against humanity 
project represents progressive development rather than codification).  
215. Id. 
216. Int’l Law Comm’n, Statement of the Chairman of the Drafting Committee 
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notify the States referred to in draft article 7, paragraph 1, of the fact 
that such person is in custody and of the circumstances which warrant 
his or her detention. The State which makes the preliminary inquiry 
contemplated in paragraph 2 of this draft article shall promptly report 
its findings to the said States and shall indicate whether it intends to 
exercise jurisdiction.” 
The idea that States must take preliminary measures to address 
crimes against humanity has been expressed in General Assembly and 
Security Council resolutions. It is also supported in State practice, at 
least in so far as torture and other similar penal treaties are concerned. 
The Commission’s commentary draws on relevant ICJ jurisprudence, 
on torture, to flesh out the nature of the obligation that such measures 
would ordinarily entail. Given the paucity of investigations and 
prosecutions of the crime at the national level, however, it is not 
entirely clear whether this provision can be said to constitute 
codification instead of progressive development. 
L. Draft Article 10—Aut Dedere Aut Judicare 
The draft convention also includes the perhaps misnamed duty to 
prosecute or extradite (aut dedere aut judicare) in draft article 10.218 
This provision is a natural follow-up to article 9 and provides that, if 
the circumstances so warrant, States must submit the cases to their 
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution unless they 
extradite that person to another State or competent international penal 
tribunal.219 In reality, as framed in the first reading draft convention, 
the provision only establishes an obligation on the State in the territory 
under whose jurisdiction the alleged offender is present to submit the 
case to its competent authorities for the purposes of prosecution, unless 
it extradites or surrenders the person to another State or competent 
international criminal tribunal.220 One issue that could arise is whether 
an international instrument should impose on prosecutorial discretion 
by requiring the prosecution of a case when the decision to do so would 
typically depend on the quality and quantity of evidence available. 
Generally, members speaking in the ILC Plenary debate supported the 
inclusion of this provision, with some linguistic suggestions.221 In the 
Drafting Committee, there was discussion over this provision—
specifically the following: 
 
218. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 35, ch. IV, art. 10. 
219. Id. art. 9. 
220. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-
Eighth Session, supra note 202, at 31.  
221. Id. 
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[W]hether to assert in [then] draft article 9 that the obligation 
contained therein was “without exception whatsoever and 
whether or not the offence was committed in a territory under its 
jurisdiction.” This expression is used in some treaties as a matter 
of emphasis. The Drafting Committee concluded that it was not 
necessary to include this clause, but that the unequivocal nature 
of the obligation set forth in the draft article should be stressed 
in the commentary.222 
This idea was indeed stressed in the commentary for this 
provision.223 
[D]iscussion also took place as to whether “international criminal 
tribunal” should be qualified by language to say that it must be 
a tribunal whose jurisdiction the sending State has recognized, as 
appears in article 11, paragraph 1, of the International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance.224  
However, this was ultimately deemed to be unnecessary. 
The final report on the Commission’s separate project, on the duty 
to prosecute or extradite, was clear that there are important gaps in 
existing international law concerning this duty in relation to most 
crimes against humanity.225 It had concluded, in the context of its work 
on the Draft Code of Crimes against the peace and security of mankind 
of 1996, that there was an obligation to prosecute or extradite in 
relation to crimes against humanity alongside genocide and war 
crimes.226 The more recent project has since concluded that this 
obligation stated in the 1996 code was driven by the need for an 
effective system of criminalization and punishment, suggesting that it 
had been adopted as a matter of progressive development.227 While that 
does not make it less authoritative or more doubtful because of its 
inclusion in the draft crimes against humanity convention, the more 
specific project had even conceded that the earlier finding did not 
appear to be driven by State practice and opinio juris to that effect. 
Yet, as an analogous crime to genocide, a rudimentary equivalent that 
 
222. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 75, at 147. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. 
225. See generally Final Report of the Int’l Law Comm’n, The Obligation to 
Extradite or Prosecute (2014), 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/reports/7_6_2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P2B8-CSTV]. 
226. Id. ¶ 3.  
227. Id. 
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does not necessarily match the text found in draft article 9 can be found 
in the Genocide Convention.  
In the circumstances, though this point is not free of difficulty, 
considering the practices of States in relation to other crimes since the 
1950s, it would appear that the inclusion of this standard can be said 
to be a form of progressive development of existing law prohibiting 
specific crimes albeit now applied in relation to crimes against 
humanity.228 This approach helps to fill a void in the contemporary 
legal framework that could not exist in relation to this crime since no 
multilateral treaty has been concluded to prohibit it in the same way 
we have had for torture or enforced disappearances.229  
M. Draft Article 11—Fair Treatment of the Alleged Offender 
Draft Article 11 of the first reading text requires that States shall 
take necessary measures pertaining to the rights of alleged offenders.230  
It requires that any person against whom measures are being taken in 
connection with an offence covered by the draft articles shall be 
guaranteed at all stages of the proceedings fair treatment, including a 
fair trial, and full protection of his or her rights under applicable 
national and international law, including human rights law.231 It also 
requires the person who is arrested or detained to be notified of the 
right to communicate without delay with the State of nationality of the 
person or the State which is otherwise entitled to protect his/her rights. 
Such persons also have the right to a visit by the representative of the 
State(s) concerned. 232 
The provision has two components at least one of which represented 
pure codification. The first relates to the concept of fair trial rights, 
which will fall in the former category and second, the issue of fair 
treatment, most likely constituting progressive development.233 There 
are aspects of the provision, which for example confers the benefits of 
consular access also to stateless persons, that may or may not reflect 
current customary international law and thus amount to progressive 
development.234  
Fair trial rights are relatively narrower in scope and are provisions 
prevalent in national constitutions, legislation, and numerous decisions 








234. See id. 
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courts and tribunals.235 The pedigree of this provision in international 
human rights, including in the International Bill of Rights236 and in 
regional and national instruments is so well settled, that it would be 
consistent with a view that it amounts to the extensive State practice, 
precedent and doctrine that is required for codification. Such fair trial 
standards, which could be read as inclusive of the broader notion of 
“fair treatment,” also apply in the field of international criminal law.237 
Indeed, just about all the statutes of international penal courts 
established to prosecute international crimes since World War II, 
including crimes against humanity, incorporates fair trial provisions.238 
The references to the highest protections offered by international law 
provide an additional form of protection to alleged offenders under the 
draft article.239   
Two questions arise for me here. First, the language of the draft 
article and its commentary carries some ambiguity. On the one hand, 
it suggests that it is intended to ensure the “fair treatment” of “any 
person” against whom measures are being taken in connection with 
crimes against humanity covered by the draft articles “at all stages of 
the proceedings.”240 One could read the latter to include preliminary 
investigations against a suspect in line with Draft article 9, paragraph 
2, through to commencement of criminal proceedings when the target 
of the investigation is arrested or detained.241 Suspects, before they are 
formally charged, enjoy certain rights. The clearest expression of this 
can be found in the Rome Statute.242 Though this standard here would 
be applicable in relation to national courts, which have other 
 
235. See e.g., ICRC, Rule 100: Fair Trial Guarantees, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule100 
[https://perma.cc/6PBC-QGN5]. 
236. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents art. 9, 
Dec. 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime art. 16, Dec. 12, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209; Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Mar. 4, 1964, 596 U.N.T.S. 
261; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 7, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 
85; G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 10, 
(Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 
14, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
237. See ICRC, supra note 235. 
238. Id. 
239. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 35, ch. IV, art. 11(1). 
240. Id. 
241. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 35, ch. IV, art. 9. 
242. Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 55. 
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protections, it might be helpful to clarify how this distinction can be 
accommodated.  
Second, although it seems implied, there is no specification in the 
draft articles that the fair treatment provision (and for that matter 
several others such as Draft Article 9, 11 and 12) may only apply to 
natural (not also legal persons).243 It might be worth clarifying this since 
some national jurisdictions may provide for the prosecution of legal 
persons for crimes against humanity under Draft Article 6. Any 
provisions in that regard must be consistent with the national law of 
the State concerned. Presumably, since a corporate body is a mere legal 
fiction through which human beings act, it might not be entitled to the 
same fair trial rights as those enjoyed by a natural person.   
N. Draft Article 12 – Victims, Witnesses, and Others 
The draft articles also provide, under draft article 12, for the 
protection of the rights of victims, witnesses and others.244 Such a 
provision is not typically found in international instruments before the 
1980s but now has a similar place in, among others, Article 68 of the 
Rome Statute.245 The provision, a form of progressive development, 
requires each State to take the necessary measures to ensure that any 
person who alleges that acts constituting crimes against humanity have 
been or are being committed has the right to complain to the competent 
authorities; provides for protective measures for complainants, victims, 
witnesses and others who participate in any investigation, prosecution, 
extradition or other proceeding; and requires States to ensure that 
victims of a crime against humanity have the right to obtain reparation 
for material or moral damages, on an individual or collective basis, 
consisting, as appropriate, of one or more of the following or other 
forms: restitution, compensation, satisfaction, rehabilitation, cessation, 
and guarantees of non-repetition.246 
This broadly framed provision indicates that the rights of victims 
under international law are also of significance in the context of crimes 
against humanity.247 The clause addresses a range of issues, from 
participation to reparations for victims of crimes against humanity.248 
This provision, in view of the enhanced standing for victims in both 
modern international human rights and international criminal law, 
could be read as constituting codification. It could be understood as an 
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existing standard merely extended to apply to a draft convention. The 
case could be stronger for progressive development.  
In the Drafting Committee debate of this clause, some members of 
the Commission suggested the inclusion of the elements set forth in 
Article 68 of the Rome Statute in the commentary to draft article 12.249 
There were also some reservations about this provision.250 While many 
members welcomed it, some questioned whether it would be better to 
include a definition of who a victim is.251 I could see the argument to 
not have a definition, which was the preference of the Special 
Rapporteur and ultimately the Commission itself. At the same time, in 
my view, a basic definition of “victims” could have been provided to 
establish a floor, rather than a ceiling, for States.  
In plain terms, this means that it would be without prejudice to a 
broader definition that may be available to provide even greater 
protections under national law. This could better ensure that a common 
or shared understanding of victimhood is provided for, as different 
national systems would have different definitions. A basic definition 
could also help ensure greater consistency and greater rights across 
different national jurisdictions. For instance, in some national systems, 
legal persons can be victims. Yet, in the crimes against humanity 
context, it might be more in line with the goals of the prohibition of 
the crime to encompass natural persons only. The latter posture would 
be consistent with Rule 85 of the ICC’s Rules of Procedure.252  
A second potential issue relates to the duty to provide a remedy for 
victims in the form of reparations which, in principle, I fully share. That 
said, I wondered whether it would be imposing a realistic obligation for 
many States afflicted with mass commission of crimes against humanity 
to provide that the State must ensure that the victims of a crime 
against humanity have the right to obtain reparation for material and 
moral damages on an individual or collective basis. This could work 
well in circumstances of small-scale commission of such crimes. It would 
no doubt be highly beneficial for victims. On the other hand, since 
crimes against humanity occur when there are widespread or systematic 
attacks against a civilian population, the question arises whether the 
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same obligation might not work as well in situations of commission of 
mass atrocity crimes.  
For example, take States such as Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and 
Liberia, all of which were embroiled in devastating conflicts or 
transitioning out of them in the 1990s.253 Hundreds of thousands were 
victims of those conflicts.254 The question is when there are so many 
victims, how a State might approach the duty to give effect to victims’ 
rights . In some of these atrocity contexts, the concerned State may 
also be on the verge of failure and have many priorities. Can such States 
realistically give effect to such a right to obtain individual and collective 
reparations? The commentaries to the provision seemed to acknowledge 
this difficulty, leaving a margin of discretion for States. But that margin 
might not be as wide as might be necessary for post conflict States. 
There were also additional concerns about, if the crimes are perpetrated 
by non-State actors rather than State actors, what duty would that 
entail for the concerned States. Will they bear the duty, say in civil 
wars, to compensate the victims even if they or their organs did not 
cause or participate in causing the harm?  
O. Draft Article 13—Extradition 
The purpose of this relatively lengthy draft article 13 is to set out 
the rights, obligations and procedures applicable to the extradition 
process, in the event that extradition is to take place.255 It anticipates 
each of the offences covered by the draft articles shall be deemed to be 
included as an extraditable offence in any extradition treaty existing 
between States.256 States undertake to include such offences as 
extraditable offences in every extradition treaty to be concluded 
between them.  This provision can be described as a “mini-extradition 
treaty within the treaty.”257 It is one of the most important provisions, 
considering present gaps in the law, which I fully supported.258 It is 
rooted, at bottom, in a long line of legal instruments on extradition 
 
253. See e.g., Mba Chidi Nmaju, The Role of Judicial Institutions in the 
Restoration of Post-Conflict Societies: The Cases of Rwanda and Sierra 
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254. World Peace Foundation, Mass Atrocity Endings Sierra Leone, (Aug. 7, 
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1994 genocide and aftermath (Aug. 7, 2015) 
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that may suggest its inclusion constitutes a form of codification of 
existing law, again, albeit, now applied specifically to crimes against 
humanity.  
Furthermore, although they frequently occur in political contexts 
and are sometimes perpetrated for political gain, core international 
crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are 
not to be regarded as “political offences” for the purposes of denying 
extradition. Paragraph 2 of the draft article makes this clear.259 This 
principle is enshrined in Article VII of the Genocide Convention.260 
Equally, though not found in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, it is 
consistent with the more recent State practice when concluding 
multilateral treaties addressing specific international and transnational 
crimes.261 Thus, its inclusion likely would help crystallize State practice 
and consolidate customary international law.  
One concern with this provision is that Draft Article 13, paragraph 
1, provides for “each of the offences covered by the present draft 
articles” to be deemed extraditable offences.262 There seems to be some 
lack of clarity regarding the scope of application. One plausible reading 
is that this only applies to Draft Article 3, which defines crimes against 
humanity, and is the object of the entire draft articles. Another reading 
is that it would additionally include Draft Article 6 requiring States to 
take the necessary measures to ensure that various other acts (such as 
attempting or ordering and soliciting crimes against humanity) are also 
offences under their national criminal laws. The former interpretation 
might be the preferable one. This uncertainty would be hopefully 
clarified by the Commission during the second reading stage of the 
topic. This article, being largely derived from existing standards albeit 
applied in transnational crimes and other contexts, could largely 
constitute customary international law and therefore be a form of 
codification.   
P. Draft Article 14—Mutual Legal Assistance 
Article 14 contains general obligations with respect to mutual legal 
assistance.263 It requires States to afford one another the widest measure 
of mutual legal assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial 
proceedings in relation to the offences covered by the draft articles in 
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accordance with the draft article.264 Like the preceding clause on 
extradition, this detailed provision on mutual legal assistance appears 
equally fundamental to the regime that would be established by a future 
crimes against humanity convention based on the ILC draft.265    
The wide scope of paragraph 1 and its applicability to the different 
forms of “investigations,” “prosecutions,” and “judicial proceedings” 
seems important.266 Mutual legal assistance is to be provided to the 
“fullest extent possible” under paragraph 3.267 In paragraph 3, which 
sets out the types of assistance that may be sought, the list contained 
therein is illustrative and not intended to be exhaustive.268 We can also 
assume that requests for mutual assistance may also be made for more 
than one of the purposes mentioned. The provision also has an annex 
which must be read together with it.  
In the end, though seemingly applied for the first time in the 
context of this crime, I am tempted to argue that this provision 
constitutes a codification of existing law. There were also some changes 
to standard clauses found in extradition treaties to better address the 
specificities of crimes against humanity. The removal of the dual 
criminality requirement makes sense, in the context of crimes against 
humanity since it would otherwise stand as an obstacle to inter-State 
cooperation. But it might constitute a form of progressive development. 
Given the nature of crimes against humanity, this seems warranted—
as mentioned in my intervention on the topic during the first reading 
in 2017.269 
Q. Draft Article 15—Settlement of Disputes 
The purpose of draft Article 15, which is the last substantive 
provision in the first reading of the draft convention, is to govern the 
settlement of inter-State disputes concerning the interpretation or 
application of the draft articles.270 The Commission typically does not 
address such final clauses, since these types of issues are usually the 
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thereafter sought to adopt a provision that would give a measure of 
flexibility for States in that they could agree to arbitration instead of 
litigating their differences before the ICJ.273  
Such an approach makes sense, especially in the context of treaties 
that entail reciprocal obligations for States, for instance, treaties of an 
economic nature. I wondered whether, given the inherently 
humanitarian purpose of the subject matter under consideration, this 
approach would be a realistic one. Furthermore, for reasons of parity, I 
preferred that the Commission basically follow the dispute settlement 
clause provided in Article IX of the 1949 Genocide Convention. 274  
IV. Some Potentially Problematic Aspects of the 
First Reading Draft Articles on Crimes Against 
Humanity 
A. General Remarks  
On balance, though in my view a potentially groundbreaking 
development from an ICL point of view, it can be noted that some of 
the ILC’s draft provisions were at times sensitive within the 
Commission itself.275 Thus, as is so often the case with such processes, 
it seems important to explore what the ILC omitted from its first ever 
draft crimes against humanity convention. For the same reasons, 
wearing the hat of an independent academic, one might query certain 
choices made by the Commission. Among the various substantive issues 
that the ILC did not fully address in the draft articles in my view, some 
of which were well debated within the Commission, four aspects seem 
particularly worth highlighting. Here, I will set aside controversies 
regarding final clauses, such as the issue of permissibility of reservations 
or the format of the dispute settlement clause, to focus only on four 
aspects. Those issues are important, but generally tend to be matters 
for States to address during treaty negotiations.   
My concerns relate to the following four substantive issues: (1) 
retention of potentially problematic aspects of the definition of crimes 
against humanity; (2) the lack of a full immunity clause, tracking 
Article 27 of the Rome Statute in its entirety, for a convention aimed 
at complementing the ICC’s jurisdiction; (3) the lack of a provision 
prohibiting State grants of blanket amnesties for crimes against 
humanity; and lastly, (4) lack of a substantive proposal for a treaty 
monitoring mechanism. Addressing these issues might have been more 
in line with the underlying purpose of such a convention. They would 
have been, if not codification, useful proposals for States as forms of 
progressive development. It would then have been up to States to 
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accept or reject them once they receive the final text and 
recommendation from the Commission in the General Assembly.  
B. The Use of the ICC Definition of Crimes Against Humanity 
Firstly, as already indicated, the ILC draft article 3 definition of 
crimes against humanity was largely copied from Article 7 of the Rome 
Statute.276 It was said that only three slight textual changes were 
necessary to reflect the different context in which the definition is being 
used.277 The reality was that some of these changes were deeper and 
more substantive. They had the effect of narrowing down the definition 
of the crime even vis-à-vis the Rome Statute definition. In this regard, 
three potential criticisms could be highlighted.  
First, Article 7 of the Rome Statute contains a definition of 
“gender” which was a compromise provision to satisfy certain groups 
that wanted to specify a meaning that would guide the future 
application.278 Interestingly, this definition of gender appears to have 
been overtaken by events since the adoption of the Rome Statute in 
July 1998.279 More inclusive definitions of the term have been offered 
by numerous human rights bodies.280 To the point that even organs of 
the ICC itself, such as the Office of the Prosecutor (“OTP”), has 
abandoned this definition as per the Prosecutor’s June 2014 “Policy 
Paper on Sexual and Gender Based Crimes.”281 Though that OTP 
policy paper was published several years ago, the issue appeared to not 
have been raised or even debated in the Commission up to the first 
reading stage. It would be interesting to see whether States and others 
will make submissions on the issue, and if so, what the response of the 
ILC might be.   
One possibility would be to review the definition if the members 
could agree a change is required and use a more recent definition of 
gender. The challenge with this option would be that what is accurate 
today might be quickly deemed out of touch with evolving 
understandings in another ten, twenty, or thirty years. This will 
essentially bring us back to where we are now with the ICC Statute. 
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Another option, which is perhaps more likely as it is more practical, 
would be to simply delete the definition. The disadvantage of the latter 
approach might be that an inconsistency may result for States party to 
the Rome Statute, which may have incorporated this aspect into their 
national law, when domesticating the ICC Statute. The solution, of 
course, would be—should those same States join the future 
convention—to modify their national laws to match the draft 
convention approach. Of course, there will be some States that prefer 
the retention of the ICC definition, for reasons of consistency or a deep 
commitment to the Rome Statute definition of gender.  
A second issue concerns the definition of some of the underlying 
crimes in the Rome Statute. Some were seen as narrower than 
customary international law following the ICC Statute’s adoption on 1 
July 1998.282 For instance, the ICTY Trial Chamber in Kupreškić has 
found that the ICC definition of the crime of persecution is not 
consistent with customary international law.283 By using the ICC 
definition of crimes against humanity, in Article 7, the ILC risks 
reinforcing a definition of persecution as a crime against humanity that 
was not only considered narrower than customary law but that 
contradicts its own earlier position on the matter. This is especially the 
case during its work on crimes against humanity in the Draft Code of 
Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.284 
Of course, the inconsistent definitions of crimes against humanity 
dates back many decades, starting with the Nürnberg and Tokyo 
Tribunal definitions through to an array of definitions used in the 
modern ad hoc tribunals such as the ICTY and ICTR and even the 
ILC’s 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind.285 In Article 5 of the ICTY Statute, the crime required a link 
to armed conflict, whether international or non-international in 
character.286 Whereas, in Article 3 of the ICTR Statute, the crime was 
defined to require discriminatory intent in order to establish proof of it 
whether on “national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds” 
which requirement was not reflected in Article 18 of the 1996 Draft 
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Code.287 If anything, there has been a shifting mix of legal ingredients 
concerning, in addition to the requirement of a nexus to an armed 
conflict, whether a widespread and/or systematic attack against any 
civilian population, or discriminatory grounds, are required.288 These 
elements of the definition have, in the words of Larissa van den Herik, 
“been swapped back and forth in a cacophony of definitions.”289 And, 
we have not yet even mentioned the apparent confusion, including 
among ICC judges, surrounding the State or organizational policy 
requirement of crimes against humanity contained in Article 7 of the 
Rome Statute.290  
One might make suggestions for changes for the second reading 
stage of the project. Let us take a prominent example of the crime of 
persecution as a crime against humanity. As defined, it prohibits, in 
Draft Article 3(1)(h), “persecution against any identifiable group or 
collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, 
gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally 
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with 
any act referred to in this paragraph or in connection with the crime of 
genocide or war crimes.”291 A good potential change could be to Draft 
Article 3 paragraph 1(h) to remove the wording “in connection with 
the crime of genocide or war crimes” since this terminology does not 
reflect customary international law.292 
The deletion of the entire second half of subparagraph (h) will bring 
the definition of persecution as a crime against humanity into 
consistency with the prior work of the ILC on the Draft Code of Crimes 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind as well as its definition 
under customary international law. Indeed, this connector requirement 
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between the crime of persecution and two other core crimes, which is 
specific to the ICC, cannot be found in the statutes of any of the ad 
hoc international or internationalized tribunals, nor in the national 
legislation of States in different parts of the world or in the 
authoritative leading case law. A related issue is that, even if the 
connector is kept, then it would make sense to revise it for the sake of 
consistency. Revising it allows the curing of an omission. The reason 
being that, at present, it essentially excludes another important ICC 
connector crime from the definition (i.e., the crime of aggression) while 
retaining the connection requirement for the other three Rome Statute 
crimes. This is an understandable omission as the ICC States only 
incorporated and activated that crime four months after the ILC first 
reading text was adopted.  
As the ICTY Trial Chamber ruled in Kupreškić, “although the 
Statute of the ICC may be indicative of the opinio juris of many States, 
Article 7(1)(h) is not consonant with customary international law.”293 
This appears all the more striking considering that the application of 
the provisions contained in Part II of the Statute (on jurisdiction, 
admissibility and applicable law), including Article 7 on crimes against 
humanity, are restricted by Article 10 of the ICC Statute which affirms 
in unequivocal language that “Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted 
as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of 
international law for purposes other than this Statute.”294 It follows, as 
the States that drafted the Statute themselves made clear, “the Statute 
did not intend to affect, amongst other things, lex lata as regards such 
matters as the definition of, among other crimes, crimes against 
humanity.”295 
Further, the complexity of defining persecution could lead to 
confusion. This is because the retention of a connecting link to “any act 
referred in this paragraph” could be read as a requirement of a link to 
one of the underlying crimes against humanity set out in paragraph 1, 
namely, (a) murder, (b) extermination, (c) enslavement, (d) 
deportation or forcible transfer of population, etc. This would be a high 
threshold but would be consistent with general understandings of this 
paragraph in the ICC Statute and most academic literature.  
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On the other hand, some academics such as Robert Cryer and 
others have speculated that if the connection required can be “satisfied 
by a linkage to even one other recognized act (a killing or other 
inhumane act),”296 the “requirement should not pose a significant 
obstacle for legitimate prosecutions of persecution.”297 In any event, as 
the ICTY Trial Chamber explained in Kupreškić, this restriction in the 
definition “might easily be circumvented by charging persecution in 
connection with “other inhumane acts of a similar character 
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to 
mental or physical health” under Article 7(1)(k).”298  
Relatedly, it seems possible to contemplate a serious form of 
persecution, which is not connected to another underlying crime. The 
ICTY/ICTR jurisprudence, for the most part, have considered 
persecution in situations where it examined crimes for which an accused 
had already been found responsible and then examined whether those 
same crimes were also committed with a discriminatory intent, and if 
so, the person was then also responsible for the crime of persecution. 
This shows gravity without a connection. Moreover, in the ad hoc 
tribunals, there have been instances where persecution was used almost 
as a residual crime with no connection whatsoever to the contents of 
other residual crimes, specifically in the area of hate speech and 
property crimes; to require a connection could stunt this development 
altogether.299  
On the other hand, to complicate matters even further, the crime 
as defined in the ILC’s first draft of the crimes against humanity 
convention is evidently narrower than the present definition of it under 
customary international law.300 It seems settled that today the crime 
would require “a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian 
population.”301 It equally seems settled that it can be committed by 
perpetrators, during times of war or peace.302  Yet, other questions 
remain. For instance, take the State policy requirement, which is 
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arguably settled under customary law.303 The ICTY Appeals Chamber, 
in its earlier case law found the State or organizational policy 
requirement relevant, but later it held in Kunarac in 2002 that the 
crime as defined in customary law no longer required proof or 
furtherance of a State or organizational policy for finding the existence 
of a crime against humanity.304 This important judicial decision was 
made in contradiction to the decision of States meeting in Rome in 
1998, which had chosen to codify the State or organizational policy 
requirement in the chapeau of Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute.305  
Against this wider historical context, it seems prudent to emphasize 
that, for the ILC, the focus was not to resolve the legal debate between 
the customary law or Rome Treaty definitions of crimes against 
humanity. The Commission seemed to choose the ICC definition purely 
for pragmatic reasons, as mentioned earlier on in this article.306 It should 
not be read as a rejection of the wider definition still available to States 
to investigate and prosecute crimes under customary international law. 
For that reason, I welcomed the explanation in its commentary to the 
definition contained in Article 3 of the draft crimes against humanity 
convention.307 The ILC has explained that the definition it had 
borrowed from Article 7 of the ICC Statute was “appropriate” mainly 
because it had already been accepted by more than 120 State parties 
to the Rome Statute.308 The Commission also considered it highly 
relevant that the same definition is now being used by many States 
when adopting or amending their national laws to domesticate the ICC 
Statute.309 On top of that, a good number of States, which are 
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U.N. Doc. A/70/10, at 8 (2015). 
306. See What Makes a Crime, supra note 290, at 391.  
307. See Statement of the Chair of the Drafting Committee (May 22, 2019), 
https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/statements/2019_dc_ch
airman_statement_cah.pdf [https://perma.cc/79HC-J5R3]. 
308. See Rome Statute, supra note 59. 
309. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, U.N. 
A/72/10 (2017) (detailing the comments and observations from the 
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presumably more likely to accept the future convention, had indicated 
that they supported the ILC crimes against humanity project on the 
condition that it retained consistency with the Rome Statute.310 So, this 
is all about pragmatics, which in context makes sense, rather than 
about freezing developments in the customary law of crimes against 
humanity.  
The threshold question, in relation to these three select concerns 
about the definition now being used by the Commission and borrowed 
from the Rome Statute: (1) the meaning of gender, (2) persecution, and 
(3) the State or organizational policy, will be whether to reopen Article 
7 of the Rome Statute based definition in the ILC draft upon second 
reading. If it is reopened, the question will be what changes can be 
justified, and what changes cannot be justified, and the basis for making 
that decision. Guidance could be found using standard criteria. For 
example, making only the changes proposed by a large group of States. 
On the other hand, if States do not raise the issues and the ILC does 
not revisit the definition, it could be argued that consistency with the 
ICC would have been achieved. The cost could be that an opportunity 
for potentially positive advances in clarifying the law of crimes against 
humanity, especially as codified in a possible future convention, would 
have been lost. Assuming, of course, the States themselves do not 
choose to amend the draft definition if and when they negotiate a crimes 
against humanity convention based on an ILC draft.  
Overall, the criticisms raised above do not take up the question 
whether the Commission should have reflected advances since the Rome 
Statute was adopted in July 1998 to use, for example, the broader 
definition of enforced disappearances reflected in the treaty adopted by 
the General Assembly in New York in December 2006.311 Nor did they 
take up the possible need that might have existed to include severe 
damage to the environment as crimes against humanity. Of course, 
States could always choose to address those issues once they receive the 
final ILC draft crimes against humanity treaty in 2019 – as they did 
 
Republic of Sierra Leone on the International Law Commission’s Draft 
Articles on Crimes Against Humanity).  
310. See Leila Nadya Sadat, A Contextual and Historical Analysis of the 
International Law Commission’s 2017 Draft Articles for a New Global 
Treaty on Crimes Against Humanity, 16 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 683, 690–
91 (2018).  
311. See Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, The International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
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with respect to several matters arising from the Commission’s draft 
statute for a permanent ICC in 1996.312  
 
C. Failure to Prohibit Immunities for Crimes Against Humanity 
A second issue that the Commission did not address in the text of 
the draft articles as adopted on first reading was the question of 
immunity of State officials, or for that matter, the officials of 
international organizations in relation to investigations and 
prosecutions of crimes against humanity.313 As discussed in the Special 
Rapporteur’s Report, “treaties addressing crimes typically do not 
contain a provision on the issue of immunity, leaving the matter to 
other treaties addressing the immunities of classes of officials or to 
customary international law.”314 The Special Rapporteur listed several 
treaties and conventions that do not include provisions on immunity of 
State officials or officials of international organizations.315 Ultimately, 
the position was that the Commission need not address the issue of 
immunity in the context of the crimes against humanity topic.316 There 
was already a separate topic considering the issue of immunity of State 
officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction.317 This position makes sense, 
and ultimately, is defensible.  
But there was also another view. In the Plenary debate, of the 
Special Rapporteur’s report, several members proposed that the 
Commission could address one aspect of the immunity issue.318 It could, 
for the sake of complementing the ICC system at the national level, 
advance the equivalent of Article 27 of the Rome Statute in the draft 
articles.319  Article 27 is the ICC’s irrelevance of official capacity clause, 
 
312. See, e.g., Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 
with commentaries, [1996] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 35.  
313. See INT’L L. COMM’N, Current status of the work of the Commission and 
forthcoming deadlines, https://legal.un.org/ilc/status.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/Q2YS-D5ZU] (showing the question of immunity was 
not addressed until 2013).  
314. Murphy, Third Rep., supra note 78, ¶ 281. 
315. See id. 
316. See id. ¶ 284. 
317. See id. 
318. See Int’ Law Comm’n Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3350, at 11 (2017).  
319. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3349, at 5 (May 2, 2017); Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on 
the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, U.N. Doc.  A/CN.4/SR.3350, at 7 
(June 2, 2017); Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth 
Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3351, at 12 (June 12, 2017); Int’l Law 
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which makes procedural and substantive immunities, whether at the 
national or international level, irrelevant for the purposes of prosecution 
of four of the most serious international crimes, including crimes against 
humanity.320  
For the ICC States Parties, this rule applies because the States 
have consented by expressly accepting this clause.321 The thought was 
that using such a clause could offer a more complementary regime to 
the ICC even if it is a form of progressive development rather than 
codification of existing law. States would have the opportunity to not 
only pronounce on that clause in written comments, but to also decide 
whether to keep it, should they accept to negotiate a convention on 
crimes against humanity based on an ILC draft.322 The non-inclusion of 
a full Article 27 equivalent seemed to also be problematic because, at 
the least, it was thought that the ILC should not advance a gap-filling 
draft crime against humanity convention partly rationalized on a logic 
of parity with the Genocide Convention while including less than the 
minimum terms provided for in the parallel treaty adopted in 1948 for 
the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide.323  
As far back as 1947, the ILC was tasked with formulating the 
Nürnberg Principles referred to at the opening of this article.324 Those 
were later endorsed by the General Assembly.325 Principle III provides 
that “the fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a 
crime under international law acted as Head of State or responsible 
Government official does not relieve him from responsibility under 
 
Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SR.3352, at 8 (June 2, 2017). But see Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. 
on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3352, at 
10 (June 2, 2017). 
320. See David P. Stewart, Official Immunity Under the Rome Statute: The 
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323. See generally G.A. Res. 260 A(III) (Dec. 9, 1948) (detailing the terms in 
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international law.”326 Building on that development, which is said to 
constitute customary international law, Article IV of the 1948 Genocide 
Convention explicitly provided that “persons committing genocide or 
any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be punished, 
whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or 
private individuals.”327  
It followed that, if as far back as 1948 States were willing to give 
up the immunities of their leaders involved with the commission of 
genocide for the purposes of prosecution in their own territories; or 
those of other contracting parties to the convention at the horizontal 
level; or before an international penal tribunal that might be established 
for such purpose at the vertical level, why might the Commission not 
ask them to consider doing so for the equally heinous crimes against 
humanity? That fundamental question, in my view, was insufficiently 
debated and ultimately remained unanswered by the ILC which 
essentially followed the preference of the Special Rapporteur on the 
issue.  
Interestingly, in both its past work on the 1954 and 1996 Draft 
Code of Crimes, the Commission had carefully examined the issue of 
official position.328 It concluded that such a principle was totally 
irrelevant to the question of individual criminal responsibility in 
Articles 3 and 7 respectively, which were to apply in respect of both 
national and international courts.329 In fact, in its helpful commentary 
to Article 7 of the 1996 Draft Code, the Commission did not mince 
words when it stated: 
The absence of any procedural immunity with respect to 
prosecution or punishment in appropriate judicial proceedings is 
an essential corollary of the absence of any substantive immunity 
or defence. It would be paradoxical to prevent an individual from 
invoking his official position to avoid responsibility for a crime 
only to permit him to invoke this same consideration to avoid the 
consequences of this responsibility.330 
 
326. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Second Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/1316, at 375 (1950). 
327. Genocide Convention, supra note 60, arts. 4, 12. 
328. Peace and Security, supra note 30 (detailing the Commission’s 
examination of the issue of official position in 1954 and detailing the 
Commission’s examination of the issue of official position in 1996).  
329. See id. at 27.  
330. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. 
Doc. A/51/10, at ¶ 50 (1996) (Articles of the draft Code of Crimes against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind). 
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Accordingly, in adopting a more recent stance that apparently 
reverts to an earlier abandoned distinction between substantive and 
procedural immunities with the applicability of the former to crimes 
against humanity but not the latter, the ILC can be said to have 
adopted a contradictory doctrinal position. The new position appears 
to not have taken into enough account if not ignored the prior work of 
the Commission and may raise other questions.331 Indeed, it muddies 
the waters concerning the value of the practice of States in respect of 
crimes against humanity, since at least the Nürnberg and Tokyo 
Tribunals.332  This is because the statutes of those special tribunals also 
engendered the same non-immunity clauses as reflected in Article 7 of 
the Nürnberg Charter and Article 6 of the Tokyo Charter as well as 
Article 11(4) of Control Council Law No. 10.333 Ironically, the same 
ILC, in the context of its separate project on immunity of state officials 
from foreign criminal jurisdiction, has provisionally adopted Draft 
Article 7 providing that immunity ratione materiae from the exercise 
of foreign criminal jurisdiction shall not apply in respect of, among 
others, crimes against humanity.334 The Commission had adopted an 
earlier article addressing immunity ratione personae, in Draft Articles 
3 and 4, which remain intact for the troika for all acts performed during 
or prior to their term of office.335 The immunities continue to attach 
under Draft Article 6(3) even after the term of office ends.336 
The ILC’s 2017 decision not to include a full irrelevance of official 
capacity clause,in the draft crimes against humanity convention, could 
also risk the significant advances made by States in developing the 
admittedly still nascent field of international criminal law. The trend, 
which many thought settled until recently, has been to limit immunities 
in the context of the commission of core crimes since at least the early 
1990s if not much earlier back to Nürnberg, a process to which the 
 
331. Peace and Security, supra note 30, at 11–12 (detailing some examples of 
the Commission’s prior work and questions surrounding the official 
position).  
332. See Jalloh, supra note 306, at 395. 
333. See id. at 395–96.  
334. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Seventy-First Session, 
U.N. Doc. A/74/10, at 311 (2019).  
335. See id. at 312 (detailing Draft Article 3); Sean D. Murphy, Immunity 
Ratione Personae of Foreign Government Officials and other Topics: The 
Sixty-Fifth Session of the International Law Commission, 108 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 41 (2014) (detailing Draft Article 4).  
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Doc. A/46/10 (1991).  
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Commission itself has made useful contributions.337 Indeed, since the 
adoption of the Nürnberg Principles, the statute of every full 
international criminal tribunal has repeatedly affirmed the essence of 
the Third Nürnberg Principle.338 Thus, we find the logic of the principle 
enshrined in Article 7(2) of the ICTY Statute and Articles 6(2) of the 
ICTY and SCSL Statutes, and ultimately, it was embedded in a fuller 
form in Article 27 of the ICC Statute.339 A plea to official capacity has 
not been successful in the judicial practice of all the modern tribunals 
as the trials of Milosevic,340 Kambanda,341 and Taylor342 amply 
demonstrated.  
Despite the significant precedents, which admittedly occurred in an 
international tribunal rather than national court context, it was 
positive that the ILC could find a compromise to include a Draft Article 
6, paragraph 5 in the first reading text of the convention.343 That 
barebones, but still important provision, along the lines of Article 27 
(1) of the Rome Statute of the ICC, provides that “[e]ach State shall 
take the necessary measures to ensure that, under its criminal law, the 
fact that an offence referred to in this draft article was committed by 
a person the holding of an official position is not a ground for excluding 
criminal responsibility.”344 This clause was directed at ensuring that 
States will take measures to deny persons involved with crimes against 
humanity the opportunity to claim exemption from substantive 
criminal responsibility or to use it as a defense to criminal liability.345 
Elsewhere, in the commentary, it is also usefully clarified that official 
 
337. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, U.N. 
Doc. A/72/10, at 179–80 (2017).  
338. See id. at 168.  
339. See 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 236-37 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 3rd 
ed. 2008).  
340. See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54, Decision on Preliminary 
Motions, ¶ 26–34 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 8, 
2001). 
341. See Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23, Judgment, ¶ 37–38, 
48 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Oct. 19, 2000). 
342. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, Judgment, ¶ 458 
(Special Court for Sierra Leone Sept. 26, 2013).  
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position is not a mitigating factor that can be used to claim a reduction 
in a sentence.346  
The commentary to the compromise clause, however, goes on to 
make crystal clear that at paragraph 31 that “paragraph 5 has no effect 
on any procedural immunity that a foreign State official may enjoy 
before a national criminal jurisdiction, which continues to be governed 
by conventional and customary international law.”347 In addition, the 
commentary clarifies that “paragraph 5 is without prejudice to the 
Commission’s work on the topic of “[i]mmunity of State officials from 
foreign criminal jurisdiction.”348 The provision, in Draft Article 7, 
indicates that immunities ratione materiae from the exercise of foreign 
criminal jurisdiction shall not apply in respect of crimes against 
humanity which are as defined in Article 7 of the Rome Statute.349 Yet, 
to be consistent with the ILC’s own work on the immunity topic, which 
had provided that no exceptions to immunity would apply in relation 
to crimes against humanity, it might have been appropriate to examine 
the implications of that stance also for this topic.350 The ICC definition 
of the crime, of course, formed the basis for the ILC definition (as 
discussed above in Part III).351 This would mean, that if given effect, it 
might have meant there would also be no immunity ratione materiae 
for crimes against humanity at the national level.352  
Consequently, although a handful of members argued against 
downgrading the ILC’s historically strong position against immunity 
for core crimes, the result is that the first reading of the draft articles 
on crimes against humanity do not contain the equivalent of Article 27 
(2); instead, it only contains a rough equivalent of Article 27(1).353 
 
346. See COMMENTARY OF THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
276 (Mark Klamberg ed., 2017).  
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350. See generally Tladi, supra note 97.  
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the Work of Its Sixty-Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L/853 (2015) 
(detailing the ILC’s definitions of crimes against humanity).  
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Adding the second paragraph would have rendered immunities or 
special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a 
person, whether under national or international law, as no bars 
preventing the courts of a State Party to the future convention from 
exercising their jurisdiction over such a person.354 The consent of the 
State, expressed through ratification or accession, would effectively 
have acted as a national jurisdiction’s waiver of any available 
immunities of its leaders from prosecution for crimes against humanity 
in the national courts of other States. The State consent element offers 
the vital safeguard needed, even if one believes that customary law 
immunities at present remain intact for crimes against humanity before 
the national court of third states for heads of state, heads of government 
or foreign ministers, as the ICJ ruled in its somewhat controversial 
Arrest Warrant ruling in early 2002.355 Of course, should they so wish, 
the ICJ statement of customary law on a given legal point such as 
immunity before national courts does not stand as an impediment to 
States with regard to their adoption of a (new) rule that might be 
contrary to such ruling since, as a matter of principle, ICJ rulings are 
only binding on the parties to a case and even so only in respect of that 
particular case.  Following Article 27 in its entirety would, in the end, 
arguably have been more consistent with the Rome Statute position. 
The ILC first reading approach of divorcing Article 27, paragraph 1 
from Article 27, paragraph 2 was not inevitable. Although it has 
sometimes been disputed whether it removed all procedural and 
substantive immunities, or only some of them, an alternative approach 
might have been to resort to full importation of Article IV of the 
Genocide Convention. That provision basically stated that persons who 
commit genocide, or conspiracy to genocide, or incitement to genocide, 
shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, 
public officials or private individuals. If the full Article 27 of the ICC 
Statute could not be reproduced in the first draft of the ILC’s draft 
crimes against humanity convention, why not use similar language to 
that of the Genocide Convention which seemed to be familiar with and 
to enjoy broad support among States. 
That said, this alternative suggestion, which seemed initially 
agreeable to the Special Rapporteur, later changed without 
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explanation.356 The Rapporteur fell back on the Article 27 (1) 
equivalent, when inserting the prior negotiated compromise.357 No 
reason for the change was given.358 One can speculate that this might 
have been because of a desire to avoid the possible argument of parity 
with Article IV of the Genocide Convention. Such an article could then 
have simply provided that persons committing crimes against humanity 
shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, 
public officials or private individuals. Some literature under the latter, 
as well as the ILC’s prior work, suggests that all forms of procedural 
and substantive immunities are irrelevant for the purposes of 
investigation and prosecution of that crime. The same would be true 
for crimes against humanity.  
If that argument holds water, for the crime of genocide, it would 
perhaps not be too much of a stretch to accept and argue that the same 
can be true for crimes against humanity in respect of State parties to a 
future draft crime against humanity convention. Copying the whole of 
Article 27, rather than picking it apart, might have ensured greater 
coherency with the ICC regime at least in relation to the treatment of 
officials of the ICC’s current 123 State parties who may commit crimes 
against humanity.359 
In the end, one could see the above argument as idealistic, 
especially given the current environment where the very idea of 
multilateralism and international law appears to be under attack. From 
this point of view, it might be that the Commission has taken a position 
that is more in line with the world in which it is functioning today. A 
world that reflects pushback at international institutions such as the 
type of pushback we see between the ICC and African States. The latter 
has been largely driven by concerns about potential abuse and misuse 
of rules on immunity.360 In this environment, it can be argued that a 
 
356. Compare Rome Statute, supra note 59, at art. 27 (detailing Article 27 of 
the Rome Statute) and G.A. Res. 260 A(III) (Dec. 9, 1948) (detailing 
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the drafting of Article 27 of the Rome Statute) (last accessed Feb. 21, 
2020). 
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more pragmatic view might be that the project as a whole, even in the 
absence of a proposal for a full immunity clause, reflected the right 
balance since it is a more incremental way of developing ICL. In any 
event, though this seems quite unlikely, States could also always choose 
to incorporate such a standard during their negotiations of a new crimes 
against humanity treaty. By the same token, though perhaps unlikely, 
they could even choose to amend other aspects of the draft articles such 
as the definition of the crime to address, for instance, severe 
environmental destruction as a crime against humanity.  
D. Failure to Reject Blanket Amnesties for Crimes Against Humanity 
A third issue regarding another element of the draft convention is 
that the text of the draft articles did not substantively address the 
challenging issue of amnesty for crimes against humanity. It was 
thought that State practice regarding amnesties was too varied to 
resolve the question whether amnesties for crimes against humanity are 
permissible before national courts.361 There was no “consensus” on the 
issue since earlier treaties such as the Genocide, Geneva, Apartheid and 
Torture Conventions did not prohibit amnesties.362 Conversely, Article 
6(5) of Additional Protocol II encouraged States to enact amnesties to 
end hostilities.363 More recent instruments addressing serious 
international crimes, such as the ICC Statute and the Enforced 
Disappearances Convention, did not preclude amnesties either.364 The 
conclusion can thus be reasonably reached, as did the Commission, and 
that there is at present no general prohibition imposed on States from 
passing amnesty laws for these types of crimes.  
On the other hand, some members of the Commission were of the 
view that the ILC’s no blanket amnesty clause position could have 
better considered the rich if admittedly still evolving domestic, regional, 
and international jurisprudence on the topic.365 The Special 
Rapporteur’s third report on the topic, speaking mostly to the Belfast 
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Guidelines on Amnesty and Accountability, seemingly obfuscated the 
issue.366 It did not fully account for the distinction between blanket and 
conditional amnesties, which might lead to different legal results.367 The 
ILC could have better grappled with the rich body of jurisprudence of 
the ad hoc international criminal tribunals on amnesty and their full 
implications for the system. From there, the ILC could have then 
contemplated whether, and if so, how to apply a similar system at the 
horizontal inter-State level.  
Let me take the example of the SCSL 13 March 2004 Appeals 
Chamber decision on amnesty in the Kallon Case.368 In that case, the 
defendant filed a preliminary challenge to the jurisdiction of the 
SCSL.369 He submitted that the Government of Sierra Leone was bound 
to observe the amnesty granted under Article IX370 of the Peace 
Agreement to the RUF and that it could not thereafter participate in 
establishing a special tribunal whose statute included a clause denying 
legal effect to the amnesty conferred on them. The Appeals Chamber 
determined that the grant of amnesty or pardon is undoubtedly an 
exercise of sovereign power which, essentially, is closely linked, as far 
as the crime is concerned, to the criminal jurisdiction of the State of 
Sierra Leone which was exercising such sovereign power.371  
That said, where jurisdiction was shared with other States—as 
would be the case for a future crime against humanity convention—one 
State cannot deprive another State of its jurisdiction to prosecute the 
offender by the grant of amnesty. The SCSL Appeals Chamber rightly 
ruled that, for this reason, it would be unrealistic to regard as 
universally effective the grant of amnesty by a State regarding grave 
international crimes, such as crimes against humanity, in which there 
would exist a broad grant of jurisdiction as per the provisions discussed 
earlier.372 Indeed, it would stand to reason, as the SCSL Appeals 
Chamber explained that “[a] State cannot bring into oblivion and 
forgetfulness a crime, such as a crime against international law, which 
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other States are entitled to keep alive and remember.”373 If this is true, 
of the Sierra Leone vis-à-vis the SCSL situation, would it not be even 
more true for a future crime against humanity convention which States 
can freely agree to?  
Furthermore, one could also take note of the policies of the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations since the Lomé Peace Accord 
in July 1999.374 Under that policy, blanket amnesties are not permissible 
for core international crimes.375 In the end, although the practice of an 
organ of an international organization may not be conclusive evidence 
of the practice of the Member States in that regard, it is also not 
entirely irrelevant to the analysis given that States do not appear to 
have objected to the Secretary General’s policy. The ILC has in fact, 
while working on the topic of identification of customary international 
law, accepted that it might secondarily be relevant to look at the 
practice of States undertaken within the context of an international 
organization.376 In the final analysis, on the amnesty issue, the 
Commission compromise forged was the fall back inclusion of some 
commentary better discussing the more recent State practice relating 
to amnesties in draft article 10 on “Aut dedere aut judicare” at 
paragraphs 8 to 11.377  
The commentary is fairly strong in almost looking down on 
amnesties. It acknowledges “that a national law would not bar 
prosecution of a crime against humanity by a competent international 
criminal tribunal or foreign State with concurrent jurisdiction over that 
crime.”378 And, even within the State that has adopted the amnesty, 
the ILC has now made ever clearer that “its permissibility would need 
to be evaluated, inter alia, in the light of that State’s obligations under 
the future draft articles requiring that they criminalize crimes against 
humanity, as well as against their duty to comply with their aut dedere 
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374. See, e.g., Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Establishes 
UN Mission for Sierra Leone to Aid with Implementation of Lome Peace 
Agreement, U.N. Press Release SC/6742 (Oct. 22, 1999) (showing 
examples of policies since the Lomé Peace Accord in July 1999).  
375. See Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915, ¶ 22; Prosecutor v. Kallon, Case 
No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé 
Accord Amnesty, ¶ 71 (Mar. 13, 2004).  
376. See Draft conclusions on identification of customary international law, 
with commentaries, [2018] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 122, U.N. Doc. 
A/73/10.  
377. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Final Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Sixth Session, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/579 (2014).  
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aut judicare obligation as well as those in relation to victims and 
others.”379 These are important elements that needed to be added to 
the commentary for clarification of the ILC position on amnesty, lest it 
be another carte blanche for States to continue to pursue such 
amnesties in their national law including for crimes against humanity 
which are some of the world’s worst crimes. It was not obvious that 
these important clarifications would have been made without serious 
pushback from a minority of members of the Commission. The present 
author played a role leading informal negotiations to find an acceptable 
compromise on the amnesty issue as well as immunities/irrelevance of 
official capacity.   
E. Absence of a Recommendation on a Monitoring Mechanism 
Finally, the ILC drat articles has not proposed any provisions for a 
monitoring mechanism, such as that under the Convention against 
Torture. A monitoring mechanism could help ensure future State party 
compliance with the obligations derived from a future convention on 
crimes against humanity. Such monitoring mechanisms are standard 
features of the major human rights treaties, including the Human 
Rights Committee under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).380 They are also found in many other modern 
human rights instruments, including those concerning racial 
discrimination,381 women,382 children,383 and disability.384 Monitoring 
bodies are also familiar in criminal law treaties such as the Torture 
Convention.385 The Third Report of the Special Rapporteur surveyed 
monitoring mechanisms, such as those within the UN human rights 
system, that already exist and could include crimes against humanity; 
however, the Special Rapporteur preferred not to make a specific 
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proposal in this regard, a view that found support within the 
Commission.386  
Though controversial, it was argued that the element of choice on 
whether to propose one was more a matter of policy rather than law.387 
The decision turns on, for example, the availability of resources and the 
relationship of a new mechanism with those that already exist. So, it 
was argued, such issues are best left for States to decide, should they 
wish to do so.388 Borrowing from an ILC Secretariat study of the issue, 
it was observed that the present treaty monitoring body system had 
caused significant financial and other strains on States.389 States could 
also choose to establish a treaty monitoring body for crimes against 
humanity alongside other such mechanisms already in place, as part of 
cost rationalization.390 This is all true and defensible.  
A minority view was that the Commission is equally well placed to 
offer a recommendation.391 A monitoring body was both a legal and 
policy question, meaning that the ILC could study the issue and 
formulate a recommendation. This group did not accept that this was 
only a matter of policy, but also saw it as about being effective in the 
design of a horizontal treaty framework.392 A small number of members 
even appeared to favor the idea of a monitoring body.393 Given the stage 
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389. See Kelisiana Thynne, Reform of United Nations Human Rights 
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11 (June 2, 2017) (detailing Mr. Jalloh’s statement, concerning the 
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Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3351, at 7–8 (June 12, 2017) (detailing Mr. Hmoud’s 
statement supporting the inclusion of a monitoring mechanism in the 
draft articles); id. at 13–15 (detailing Mr. Saboia’s statement supporting 
the inclusion of a monitoring mechanism to ensure a future convention 
fulfills its goals); Int’l Law Comm’n, Sixty-Ninth Session, Provisional 
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of the project, it would be interesting to see if any State wishes to see 
a recommendation for a monitoring body for crimes against humanity. 
In the absence of an independent enforcement mechanism, the future 
convention could be extremely weak and dependent solely upon State 
cooperation, which can be more regularly monitored if a treaty body 
mechanism is contemplated.394 Thus, rather than being a policy 
question outside of the ILC’s domain, this was a technical legal question 
of a long-awaited treaty instrument concerning a core crime under 
international law.  
Thus, rather than taking no substantive proposals forward, the 
Commission should not shy away from weighing the pros and cons of 
such a mechanism and offering up a studied recommendation to States. 
The Commission could have even developed alternative options for 
States to consider using the existing mechanisms to cover this future 
convention, even if on an optional protocol basis. The latter would allow 
the main instrument to focus on prevention and punishment of crimes 
against humanity. The optional protocol would then provide the choice 
to join the treaty monitoring system. In any event, as with other aspects 
of the proposed draft crimes against humanity convention as a whole, 
it would be up to the States to decide ultimately whether they would 
retain or abandon any final ILC proposals concerning a treaty 
monitoring body. An interesting historical footnote here is that, while 
the main ILC proposals for the ICC draft statute were retained, in some 
cases such as the trigger mechanism which provided for an independent 
prosecutor, the ILC was more modest in its proposals than States when 
they met at Rome in 1998 to negotiate the ICC instrument.395  
For that reason, it may be that had a clause been included and 
properly justified, it would likely have bolstered the case for such a 
mechanism to UN Member States. Whereas the converse, that is the 
non-inclusion of one, might also weaken the case for it. It could be 
misread as sending a signal that the ILC did not consider the topic 
important enough. Ultimately, the omission of a recommendation was 
hidden behind policy rationales, but at bottom, it seemed aimed at 
increasing the future political acceptability of the future convention. 
The same might be said, concerning the issues of immunity, amnesties, 
 
A/CN.4/SR.3353, at 3 (June 2, 2017) (detailing Mr. Ouazzani’s statement 
supporting a monitoring body mechanism); id. at 6 (detailing Mr. 
Vazquez-Bermudez’s statement supporting the draft articles calling for 
the creation of two monitoring mechanisms); id. at 7 (detailing Mr. 
Gomez-Robledo’s statement calling for the Commission to make a 
recommendation regarding a monitoring mechanism). 
394. What Makes a Crime, supra note 290, at 419. 
395. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, The International Criminal Court 
Trigger Mechanism and the Need for an Independent Prosecutor (1997). 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) 
The International Law Commission’s First Draft Convention on Crimes 
Against Humanity 
403 
and even the definition of crimes against humanity. This concern 
appears true about other aspects of the draft convention as well.  
In sum, there are many positive aspects the ILC’s first draft 
convention on crimes against humanity. The present author is highly 
encouraged by the progress that the Commission has accomplished to 
date since taking up the crimes against humanity topic in 2014.396 One 
must particularly appreciate that we have a full draft convention that 
may offer a single commonly accepted definition of the crime, as well 
as the explicit duties of prevention and punishment that are required 
of State parties under Articles 4 to 15 of the draft convention, including 
the crucial elements of prevention and punishment, as well as modalities 
for extradition and mutual legal assistance.397 The latter were borrowed 
from the transnational crimes context and offer the additional 
advantage of addressing current normative gaps in the Rome Statute 
legal framework.398  
I am also highly encouraged by the generally positive responses 
received from approximately fifty States during the debate on crimes 
against humanity in the Sixth Committee in October 2017.399 It is my 
hope that many if not all those States, as well as others, will go on to 
provide the detailed commentary that the Commission has invited by 
December 2018. This will enable the ILC, especially if States reflect and 
provide guidance on the difficult questions including the definition, 
immunities, amnesties, and monitoring mechanisms, to further 
strengthen the final instrument that it will present to them after 
completion of the second and final reading of the draft convention.  
One potentially major challenge, which is already evident, is that 
all friends of the ILC and ICL will need to work hard to ensure that 
States in the General Assembly do not place the draft convention on 
the shelf—as they have so often done with many other more recent ILC 
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projects. There are States that are working on a parallel mutual legal 
assistance initiative, led by the Netherlands. The content of the draft 
treaty that they seek to conclude is not known, save that it will address 
mutual legal assistance and extradition for three core crimes, namely, 
crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes. Those same States 
will hopefully also support, if not adopt, the outcome of the ILC’s work 
when it is completed as possibly a starting point for the negotiation of 
their treaty text.400 I hope that the ICC too, which so far has shown 
little substantive interest in the crimes against humanity project, will 
engage with the Commission on the issue—as the ICRC does regularly 
on subjects concerning the law of armed conflict. 
V. Conclusion 
Overall, this article sought to demonstrate that the ILC’s mandate 
to promote the progressive development and codification of 
international law permeates all its work. The mix of the two can be 
found in many of its projects over the course of the past seventy years. 
That in turn reflects the integrated nature of the tasks of codification 
and progressive development of international law. This mix of 
progressive development and codification can also be found in the 
subfield of international criminal law, as demonstrated by this article, 
which has focused on the Commission’s latest project in this subfield in 
relation to the topic of crimes against humanity. The paper has 
suggested that some, if not most of the 15 draft provisions adopted by 
the Commission on first reading in 2017, may reflect codification of 
existing law. To the extent that the extension of an existing rule already 
recognized by States to cover a new situation will fall within the 
meaning of that term under Article 15 of the Statute and in the practice 
of the Commission.  
In any event, even if some of the other provisions can be said to be 
progressive development, that too would be within the mandate 
entrusted to the ILC by States. Indeed, far from being separable, the 
tasks seem intertwined, interdependent and indivisible. In this scheme, 
even within a single provision such as the crimes against humanity 
definition, there will be aspects that can also be said to reflect 
customary international law, meaning that those aspects will be 
considered codification rather than forms of progressive development. 
The recognition of the delicate task seems to be confirmed by the earlier 
practice and experience of the ILC and the works of academics. In other 
words, the draft articles on crimes against humanity are not one or the 
other; rather, as with most ILC texts, they are an approximate mix of 
both. 
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It is also appropriate for the effective prevention and punishment 
of one of the worst crimes known to international law for the 
Commission, where necessary, to advance gap filling proposals even 
though these may amount to progressive development. Importantly, to 
the strict constructionists of international law that might insist on a 
clear distinction between the two tasks, it is important to emphasize 
that it will in the end be up to States to decide how to approach the 
Commission’s final work product. This topic on crimes against 
humanity will be no different. The way it has been treated also properly 
recognizes the separation of functions between the role of independent 
experts and the representatives of States in the Sixth Committee of the 
General Assembly.401 It is hoped that, when they eventually receive the 
recommendation of the Commission on the draft convention on crimes 
against humanity, States will find it fit to take the item forward and 
finally fill one of the currently missing links in the substantive law of 
international crimes. Well over half a century later, this important 
crime will have been put on the same plane as genocide and war crimes, 
both of which were codified in multilateral treaties as far back as 1948 
and 1949.402 If States choose to do so, it would potentially constitute 
one of the Commission’s most important contributions to the 
development of the nascent field of ICL.  
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